# Inferring Internet Server IPv4 and IPv6 Address Relationships

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CAIDA Active Internet Measurement 2013



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# Sibling Resolution

### New Problem We Term "Sibling Resolution:"

Given a candidate (*IPv*4, *IPv*6) address pair, determine if these addresses are assigned to the same cluster, device, or interface.

- Lots of prior work on passive sibling associations: e.g. web-bugs, javascript, flash, etc.
- Prior work focuses on clients (adoption, performance)
- This work:
  - Targeted, active test: on-demand for any given pair
  - Infrastructure: finding server siblings
- Eventual goal: router siblings (not there yet)

# **Motivation**

Why?

- Adoption (non-adoption):
  - IPv4 and IPv6 expected to co-exist (for a long while?)  $\rightarrow$  dual-stacked devices
  - Track IPv6 evolution
- Security:
  - IPv6 is largely unsecured!
  - Inter-dependence of IPv6 on IPv4 (and vice-versa)
  - e.g. attack on IPv6 resource affecting IPv4 service
  - Correlating geolocation, reputation, etc with IPv4 host counterpart.
- Performance:
  - Getting measurements of IPv4 vs. IPv6 performance correct: isolate path vs. host performance
- Operationally <u>deployed</u> today in Akamai, informing Edgescape geolocation.

## **Techniques**

### 3 Techniques:

- (Passive) Induce DNS resolvers to use both v4 and v6 during natural resolution of Akamai resources (deployed, large set of measurements).
- (Active) Force DNS to use a *chain* of v4 and v6 addresses to perform resolution. Allows us to validate (a subset) of the passively collected results.
- (Active) Probe potentially in-common TCP stack of a candidate v4, v6 sibling pair to obtain timestamp fingerprint.



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### **Passive DNS**

- Encode IPv4 address of querying resolver into a AAAA record returned for the next-level NS
- Subsequent query to the IPv6 authority nameserver permits linking v4 and v6 resolver addresses



## Active DNS

- Custom DNS server as authority for special domain
- Chain of alternating v6, v4 CNAME records, only available via v6 or v4, that maintain state within the dynamic name.



Beverly, et al. (NPS)

### **DNS Results**

- Deployed on Akamai; gathered  $\simeq$  675,000 v4,v6 pairs
- Importance: directing users to content in a CDN relies on properties of DNS resolution. Improves IPv6 geolocation.
- 77% of v4,v6 pairs are 1-1, the rest is messy. Most complexity due to large cluster resolvers (e.g. nominum, google DNS, openDNS, comcast, etc).





## Targeted, Active Technique

- Intuition: IPv4 and IPv6 share a common transport-layer (TCP) stack
- Leverage prior work on physical device fingerprinting using TCP timestamp clockskew [Kohno 2005]
- TCP timestamp option: "TCP Extensions for High Performance" [RFC1323, May 1992]. Universally supported, enabled by default.
- Note: TS clock  $\neq$  system clock
- Note: TS clock frequently unaffected by system clock adjustments (e.g. NTP)
- **Basic Idea:** Probe over time. Fingerprint is clock *skew* (and remote clock resolution).



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Image: Image:

### Example

- Gather 4 timestamp series:
  - www.caida.org (v4 and v6)
  - www.ripe.net (v4 and v6)



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#### Methodology

#### Examples

## Example



- Observe different skew slopes (one negative)
- Different timestamp granularity
- y = 0.029938x equates to skew of ≈ 1.8ms / minute, or ≈ 15 minutes per year.

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False siblings!



#### Methodology

Examples

### Example



- CAIDA IPv4 vs. CAIDA IPv6: identical slopes ( $\theta = 0.0098$ )
- CAIDA IPv6 vs. RIPE IPv4: different slopes ( $\theta = 31.947$ )

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## **Complications**



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# Complications



www.apache.com

• Raw TCP timestamps

- Deterministically random and monotonic for a single connection
- Random across connections. Looks like noise to us.

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# Complications





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# Complications





## Machine Sibling Inference

### Machine Sibling Inference Methodology:

- Analyze Alexa top 100,000 websites
- Pull A and AAAA records
- 1398 ( $\approx$  1.4%) have IPv6 DNS
- Repeatedly fetch root HTML page via IPv4 and IPv6 via deterministic IP address
- Record all packets



# Machine Sibling Inference

### Alexa 100K Targeted Machine-Sibling Inference

Case	Count
v4 and v6 non-monotonic (possible siblings)	109 (7.8%)
v4 or v6 non-monotonic (non-siblings)	140 (10.0%)
v4 and v6 no timestamps (possible siblings)	94 (6.7%)
v4 or v6 no timestamps (non-sibling)	101 (7.2%)

- Our technique fails when timestamps are not monotonic across TCP flows (e.g. load-balancer or BSD OS)
- Or, when timestamps are not supported (e.g. middlebox)
- Note, can disambiguate non-siblings

# Machine Sibling Inference

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v4 and v6 no timestamps (possible siblings)	94 (6.7%)
v4 or v6 no timestamps (non-sibling)	101 (7.2%)
Skew-based siblings	839 (60.0%)
Skew-based non-siblings	115 (8.3%)
Total	1398 (100%)

- 25.5% (356) non-siblings
- 57% of skew-based non-siblings are in same AS
- 12.6% of skew-based siblings are in *different* ASes

### Feedback

### Thanks!

- Viz: Awesome scatter plot!
- Data-Sharing: None so far (Akamai data off-limits, web-probing can be released)
- Feedback:
  - Do you believe our motivation story !?!?
  - Operational experience with large DNS resolvers?
  - Thoughts on router v4,v6 sibling resolution?



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