
# Subsidization Competition: Vitalizing the Neutral Internet

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WIE 2014


# Internet's two-sided market



Problem is not in the transit market

- Fiber optics backbone, rare congestion
- Competitive market with declining prices
- CPs bypass Tier-1 ISPs to improve performance
- But in the mobile access market
  - High mobile infrastructure costs
  - One-side pricing from end-users
  - Lower profit margin than those of the CPs
  - Few incentives for investments

# About this work



Propose and study "subsidization competition"

• CPs could voluntarily subsidize its users' usage costs

Differences to sponsored data plan/"zero rate"


- 1. Partial subsidization is allowed
- 2. ISPs charge the same per-unit rate, regardless the source of revenue (no secret deals with CPs)

# Basic system model $(m, \mu)$

- □ Focus on an access ISP with capacity  $\mu$  and a set  $\mathcal{N}$  of CPs. For each  $i \in \mathcal{N}$ , denote  $\bigcirc m_i$ : user size,  $\lambda_i$ : avg per user throughput  $\bigcirc \theta_i \triangleq m_i \lambda_i$  as throughput and  $\theta \triangleq \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} \theta_i$
- Define φ ≜ Φ(θ,μ) as the system utilization
   Φ(θ,μ) ≯ θ; Φ(θ,μ) ↘ μ
   Can be seen as system congestion

□ User throughput satisfies  $\lambda_i \triangleq \lambda_i(\phi) \searrow \phi$ 

## Basic system model $(m, \mu)$



 $\Box \phi$  is the utilization of a system (*m*,  $\mu$ ) iff


$$\phi = \Phi\left(\sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} m_i \lambda_i(\phi), \mu\right)$$

 $\Box$  utilization is unique  $\rightarrow$  throughput of CPs

# One-sided pricing model

**If ISP charges** p, its revenue is  $R \triangleq p\theta$ 

□ User size:  $m_i \triangleq m_i(p) \searrow p$ 



# One-sided pricing model

Price effect:


$$\frac{\partial \phi}{\partial p} \le 0; \ \frac{\partial \theta}{\partial p} \le 0.$$

- $\Box \ \text{CP } i \text{'s throughput } \theta_i \text{ increases with price } p \text{ iff } \epsilon_p^{m_i} / \epsilon_\phi^{\lambda_i} < -\epsilon_p^{\phi}$
- where  $\epsilon_x^y \triangleq \frac{\partial y}{\partial x} \frac{x}{y}$  denotes the x-elasticity of y.  $\circ |\epsilon_p^{m_i}|$  small: users are not price sensitive  $\circ |\epsilon_{\phi}^{\lambda_i}|$  large: traffic is very sensitive to congestion

## Subsidization model

- □ Denote q as a policy that limits the subsidy, each CP i choose to subsidize  $s_i \in [0, q]$
- $\square$  Denote s as the strategy profile of the CPs
- □ User size becomes  $m_i = m_i(t_i) = m_i(p s_i)$
- **CP's utility becomes**  $U_i = (v_i s_i)\theta_i$
- **Define social welfare**  $W = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} v_i \theta_i$

## Subsidization model



# Nash equilibrium

For price p and policy q, a strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium iff each s<sub>i</sub> solves

$$Max U_i(s_i; \mathbf{s}_{-i}) = (v_i - s_i)\theta_i(\mathbf{s})$$
  
s.t.  $0 \le s_i \le q$ .

□ There exists a unique Nash equilibrium if for any  $s' \neq s$ , there always exist CP *i* such that  $(s'_i - s_i)(u_i(s') - u_i(s)) < 0$ where  $u_i = \partial U_i(s) / \partial s_i$  defines the marginal utility.

# Dynamics of equilibrium

□ If a CP *i*'s profitability increases unilaterally from  $v_i$  to  $v'_i$ , under Nash equilibrium,  $s'_i \ge s_i$ .

Dynamics of the Nash equilibrium:

$$\frac{\partial s_i}{\partial q} = \begin{cases} 0 & if \ s_i = 0\\ 1 & if \ s_i = q\\ \dots & otherwise \end{cases}$$

$$\frac{\partial s_i}{\partial p} = \begin{cases} 0 & if \ s_i = 0 \ or \ s_i = q \\ \dots & otherwise \end{cases}$$

# Policy implications

Result: Under fixed price p, if marginal utility matrix is off-diagonally monotone,

$$\frac{\partial \phi}{\partial q} \ge 0, \qquad \frac{\partial R}{\partial q} \ge 0 \text{ and } \frac{\partial s_i}{\partial q} \ge 0 \ \forall i \in \mathcal{N}$$

- Deregulation incentivize CPs to subsidize, increase system utilization and ISP revenue
- Implications: deregulation is desirable for improving investment incentives for ISPs

# Policy under ISP's optimal price


□ Consider a 3-stage game:

- 1. Regulator chooses policy q
- 2. ISP chooses optimal price p(q)
- 3. CPs choose subsidies s

Policy effect: \$\frac{dm\_i}{dq}\$ = \$\dots\$, \$\frac{d\phi}{dq}\$ = \$\dots\$, \$\frac{d\lambda\_i}{dq}\$ = \$\dots\$, \$\dots\$,

•  $\left| \epsilon_{t_i}^{m_i} \right|$  small: users are not price sensitive •  $\left| \epsilon_{\phi}^{\lambda_i} \right|$  large: traffic is sensitive to congestion •  $\left| \epsilon_q^{t_i} \right|$  small: CP is less profitable

## Revenue and social welfare



Relaxed policy induces higher R and W
Price regulation might be needed

# Conclusions

### □ Study subsidization competition among CPs,

- ISP uses the same per-unit charge
- Partial subsidy is allowed

Properties

- the network is physically neutral
- it creates a feedback loop for CPs to compete
- increase access revenue and attract investment

#### Caveats

- Utilization will increase, some CPs have lower rates
- ISP's price might need to be regulated if the market is not competitive enough

## FCC Open Internet Order

Transparency

 must disclose network management practices, performance characteristics, and ...

No blocking

 may not block lawful content, applications, services, non-harmful devices ...

No unreasonable discrimination

 may not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic ...

# How do we want to regulate?

□ It is about "no unreasonable discrimination"

### Existing solution

- impose an absolute minimum requirement for ordinary class
- however, ISPs have different capacities ...

### Our proposal

- restrict the maximum gap in service quality
- implication: if you make premium class better, you need to make ordinary class better too.

## References

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