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<b>URL:</b>
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<a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/hq6386k2p3317443/">http://www.springerlink.com/content/hq6386k2p3317443/</a>
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<b>ENTRY DATE:</b>
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2008-06-16


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<b>ABSTRACT:</b>
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In our search for anonymization solutions for passive measurement data
in the context of the LOBSTER passive network monitoring project, we
discovered attacks against two initially promising candidates for IP
address anonymization. We present a suite of three algorithms employing
packet injection and frequency analysis, which can compromise individual
addresses protected with prefix-preserving anonymization in multilinear
time. We present two algorithms to counter our attacks. These methods
support gradual release of topological information, as required by some
applications. We also introduce an algorithm that strengthens some
hash-based anonymization methods.



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