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<b>URL:</b>
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<a href="http://www.ece.cmu.edu/~reiter/papers/2007/NDSS1.pdf">http://www.ece.cmu.edu/~reiter/papers/2007/NDSS1.pdf</a>
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<b>ENTRY DATE:</b>
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2008-06-16


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<b>ABSTRACT:</b>
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Encouraging the release of network data is central to promoting sound
network research practices, though the publication of this data can leak
sensitive information about the publishing organization. To address this
dilemma, several techniques have been suggested for anonymizing network
data by obfuscating sensitive fields. In this paper, we present new
techniques for inferring network topology and deanonymizing servers
present in anonymized network data, using only the data itself and
public information. Via analyses on three different network datasets, we
quantify the effectiveness of our techniques, showing that they can
uncover significant amounts of sensitive information. We also discuss
prospects for preventing these deanonymization attacks.



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