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<b>URL:</b>
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<a href="http://www.cs.jhu.edu/~cwright/NDSS08.pdf">http://www.cs.jhu.edu/~cwright/NDSS08.pdf</a>
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<b>ENTRY DATE:</b>
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2008-06-16


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<b>ABSTRACT:</b>
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Anonymization plays a key role in enabling the public release of network
datasets, and yet there are few, if any, techniques for evaluating the
efficacy of network data anonymization techniques with respect to the
privacy they afford. In fact, recent work suggests that many
state-of-the-art anonymization techniques may leak more information than
first thought. In this paper, we propose techniques for evaluating the
anonymity of network data. Specifically, we simulate the behavior of an
adversary whose goal is to deanonymize objects, such as hosts or web
pages, within the network data.  By doing so, we are able to quantify
the anonymity of the data using information theoretic metrics,
objectively compare the efficacy of anonymization techniques, and
examine the impact of selective deanonymization on the anonymity of the
data. Moreover, we provide several concrete applications of our approach
on real network data in the hope of underscoring its usefulness to data
publishers.




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