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<b>URL:</b>
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<a href="http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/637684.html">http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/637684.html</a><br/>
<a href="https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-89.pdf">https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-89.pdf</a>
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<b>ENTRY DATE:</b>
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2008-06-16


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<b>ABSTRACT:</b>
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This paper introduces an information theoretic model that allows to
quantify the degree of anonymity provided by schemes for anonymous
connections. It considers attackers that obtain probabilistic
information about users. The degree is based on the probabilities an
attacker, after observing the system, assigns to the different users of
the system as being the originators of a message. As a proof of concept,
the model is applied to some existing systems. The model is shown to be
very useful for evaluating the level of privacy a system provides under
various attack scenarios, for measuring the amount of information an
attacker gets with a particular attack and for comparing different
systems amongst each other.




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