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<b>URL:</b>
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<a href="http://www.cs.rutgers.edu/dataman/552dir/papers/lab99.pdf">http://www.cs.rutgers.edu/dataman/552dir/papers/lab99.pdf</a>
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<b>Entry Date:</b>
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2003-05-14


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<b>Abstract:</b>
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This paper examines the network routing messages exchanged between
core Internet backbone routers. Internet routing instability, or the
rapid fluctuation of network reachability information, is an important
problem currently facing the Internet engineering community. High
levels of network instability can lead to packet loss, increased
network latency and time to convergence. At the extreme, high levels
of routing instability have led to the loss of internal connectivity
in wide-area, national networks. In an earlier study of inter-domain
routing, we described widespread, significant pathological behaviors
in the routing information exchanged between backbone service
providers at the major U.S. public Internet exchange points. These
pathologies included several orders of magnitude more routing updates
in the Internet core than anticipated, large numbers of duplicate
routing messages, and unexpected frequency components between routing
instability events. The work described in this paper extends our
earlier analysis by identifying the origins of several of these
observed pathological Internet routing behaviors. We show that as a
result of specific router vendor software changes suggested by our
earlier analysis, the volume of Internet routing updates has decreased
by an order of magnitude. We also describe additional router software
changes that can decrease the volume of routing updates exchanged in
the Internet core by an additional 30 percent or more. We conclude
with a discussion of trends in the evolution of Internet architecture
and policy that may lead to a rise in Internet routing instability.


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<b>Datasets:</b>
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BGP updates collected over 28 months (Mar 96 to Jun 98) at 5 U.S.
exchange points: AADS, Mae-East, Mae-West, PacBell, and Sprint


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<b>Results:</b>
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Quoting and paraphrasing from paper:
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<li>The volume of inter-domain routing updates has decreased by
    an order of magnitude since April 1997. For the first time since
    the end of the NSFNet, the number of BGP announcements has
    surpassed the number of withdrawals.
    <ul>
       <li>most of decrease in redundant withdrawals caused by
           stateless BGP implementations</li>
    </ul></li>
<li>The majority of BGP messages consists of redundant, pathological
    announcements.</li>
<li>The number of BGP announcements per day almost doubled over the
    28 months, while the routing table did not grow in proportion.</li>
<li>Fluctuation in prefix reachability information accounted for
    over 40% of all non-WWDup updates (updates other than redundant
    withdrawals).</li>
<li>An average of 10-15% of BGP updates were AADiff (implicit
    withdrawal with different path attributes); these represent policy
    changes or pathological behavior.
    <ul>
       <li>on average, only 20-30% of all AADiffs involve AS path changes</li>
       <li>oscillation in the community, aggregator, next hop, and
           origin attributes accounted for a combined total of 10%
           of all AADiffs</li>
       <li>oscillations in MED constituted the single largest
           category of AADiffs, averaging between 25% and 40%
           in the last 11 months of the study; 90% of these
           oscillations caused by just two ISPs that dynamically
           computed MED values of eBGP routes from IGP metrics</li>
    </ul></li>
<li>After January 1998, AADup (implicit withdrawal with same path
    attributes) was the single largest category of BGP updates
    and accounted for 30-40% of the updates seen each day.
    <ul>
       <li>may have two causes related to BGP software implementations:
           (1) non-transitive attribute filtering, and (2) interaction
           between MinRouteAdvert timer and stateless BGP</li>
    </ul></li>
<li>Only a small percentage of the total number of BGP updates generated
    each day is due to persistent oscillations, that is, a sustained
    (usually on the order of several hours or more), high frequency
    oscillation in prefix reachability or path attributes.</li>
<li>Instability is not disproportionately dominated by prefixes of
    specific lengths.</li>
<li>We experimentally confirmed a number of the origins of pathological
    routing behavior postulated in our earlier work.
    <ul>
        <li>redundant withdrawals caused by stateless BGP</li>
        <li>periodicity in update arrivals caused by unjittered timers</li>
    </ul></li>
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<b>References:</b>
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This is a followup to the paper "Internet Routing Instability" by the
same authors.




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