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<b>URL:</b>
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<a href="http://www.cs.cornell.edu/~mvnak/pubs/ldiversity-icde06.pdf">http://www.cs.cornell.edu/~mvnak/pubs/ldiversity-icde06.pdf</a>
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<b>ENTRY DATE:</b>
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2008-06-16


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<b>ABSTRACT:</b>
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Publishing data about individuals without revealing sensitive
information about them is an important problem. In recent years, a new
definition of privacy called k-anonymity has gained popularity. In a
k-anonymized dataset, each record is indistinguishable from at least k-1
other records with respect to certain identifying attributes.  In this
paper we show with two simple attacks that a k-anonymized dataset has
some subtle, but severe privacy problems. First, we show that an
attacker can discover the values of sensitive attributes when there is
little diversity in those sensitive attributes. Second, attackers often
have background knowledge, and we show that k-anonymity does not
guarantee privacy against attackers using background knowledge. We give
a detailed analysis of these two attacks and we propose a novel and
powerful privacy definition called l-diversity. In addition to building
a formal foundation for l-diversity, we show in an experimental
evaluation that l-diversity is practical and can be implemented
efficiently.





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