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<b>URL:</b>
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<a href="http://arxiv.org/abs/0710.3979">http://arxiv.org/abs/0710.3979</a>
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<b>ENTRY DATE:</b>
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2008-06-16


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<b>ABSTRACT:</b>
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Network data needs to be shared for distributed security
analysis. Anonymization of network data for sharing sets up a
fundamental tradeoff between privacy protection versus security analysis
capability. This privacy/analysis tradeoff has been acknowledged by many
researchers but this is the first paper to provide empirical
measurements to characterize the privacy/analysis tradeoff for an
enterprise dataset. Specifically we perform anonymization options on
single-fields within network packet traces and then make measurements
using intrusion detection system alarms as a proxy for security analysis
capability. Our results show: (1) two fields have a zero sum tradeoff
(more privacy lessens security analysis and vice versa) and (2) eight
fields have a more complex tradeoff (that is not zero sum) in which both
privacy and analysis can both be simultaneously accomplished.




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