The UCSD Network Telescope

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What is CAIDA?

- Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis

- Goals include measuring and understanding the global Internet.

- Develop measurement and analysis tools

- Collect and provide Internet data: topology, header traces, bandwidth testlab, network security, DNS

- Visualization of the network
Current Project Areas

- Routing topology and behavior
- Passive monitoring and workload characterization
- Internet Measurement Data Catalog
- Bandwidth estimation
- Flow collection and efficient aggregation
- Security: DoS and Internet worms
- DNS performance and anomalies
- Visualization
Outline

• What is a Network Telescope?

• The SCO Denial-of-Service Attack

• The Witty Internet Worm
  – Background
  – Witty Worm Spread
  – Witty Worm Victims
  – Conclusions
Network Telescope

- Chunk of (globally) routed IP address space
  - 16 million IP addresses
- Little or no legitimate traffic (or easily filtered)
- Unexpected traffic arriving at the network telescope can imply remote network/security events
- Generally good for seeing explosions, not small events
- Depends on random component in spread
Network Telescope: Denial-of-Service Attacks

- Attacker floods the victim with requests using random spoofed source IP addresses
- Victim believes requests are legitimate and responds to each spoofed address
- We observe $1/256^{th}$ of all victim responses to spoofed addresses [MSV01]
Denial-of-Service Attacks
DoS Attacks over time
SCO Denial-of-Service Attack

- Who is SCO?
  - UNIX (linux) software company
  - Originally Santa Cruz Operations
  - Caldera bought Unix Server Division from Santa Cruz Operations in August of 2000
  - Caldera changed its name to "The SCO Group" in August 2002
  - Sued IBM in March 2003 claiming that IBM misappropriated its UNIX operating system intellectual property (acquired from Novell)
  - Threatened lawsuits against many others
SCO Denial-of-Service Attack Timeline

- May 2003: SCO gets hit by its first major DoS Attack
- August 2003: SCO gets hit by its second major DoS Attack
  - Random rumors that an internal network problem was publicized as a DoS attack
- December 10, 2003 1:37 PM: groklaw.net blog "reports" on rumors that SCO is not being attacked; they are faking the whole thing to implicate the open source community
- December 11, 2003 2:50 AM: the SYN flood is expanded to target SCO's ftp server in addition to their webservers
- December 11, 3003 noon: SCO takes themselves off the 'net while pursuing upstream filters to block the attack
SCO Denial-of-Service Attack

http://www.caida.org/analysis/security/sco-dos/

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SCO DoS Attack "Results"

• Security experts (us included) need to be careful what they say in the absence of details
  – Sure, technology exists to thwart SYN floods, but not at 340 MB/s inbound coming to a DS3
• It's no fun to be a SCO network admin
  – your own ISP won't admit they give you connectivity, let alone corroborate the attack reports
  – your CEO is quoting the aforementioned security experts who say any 5 year old could stop the attack
  – your only hope is upstream ISPs helping you, but your company is not popular with NOC employees
• Why did folks believe SCO was faking the attack?
What is a Network Worm?

• Self-propagating self-replicating network program
  – Exploits some vulnerability to infect remote machines
    • No human intervention necessary
  – Infected machines continue propagating infection
Network Telescope: Worm Attacks

- Infected host scans for other vulnerable hosts by randomly generating IP addresses
- We monitor 1/256\textsuperscript{th} of all IPv4 addresses
- We see 1/256\textsuperscript{th} of all worm traffic of worms with no bias and no bugs
Witty Worm Background
March 19, 2004

• ISS Vulnerability
  – A buffer overflow in a PAM (Protocol Analysis Module) in a
    Internet Security Systems firewall products
    • Version 3.6.16 of iss-pam1.dll
  – Analyzes ICQ traffic (inbound port 4000)
  – Discovered by eEye on March 8, 2004
  – Jointly announced March 18, 2004 when “patch” available
    • Upgrade to the next version at customer cost…

• By far the closest to a zero-day exploit
  – Instead of 2-4 weeks after bug release, Witty appeared
    after 36 hours
Witty Worm Structure
March 19, 2004

• Infests a host running an ISS firewall product
• Sends 20,000 UDP packets as quickly as possible:
  – to random source IP addresses
  – to random destination port
  – with random size between 796 and 1307 bytes
• Damage Victim:
  – select random physical device
  – seek to random point on that device
  – attempt to write over 65k of data with a copy of the beginning of the vulnerable dll
• Repeat until machine is rebooted or machine crashes irreparably
Typical (Code-Red) Host Infection Rate

![Code Red Worm - infected hosts graph](image)
Early Growth of Witty (5 minutes)
Witty Worm Spread
March 19, 2004

• Sharp rise via initial coordinated activity
• Peaked after approximately 45 minutes
  – Approximately 30 minutes later than the fastest worm we’ve seen so far (SQL Slammer)
  – Still far faster than any human response
  – At peak, Witty generated:
    • 90 GB/sec of network traffic
    • 11 million packets per second
Early Growth of Witty (2 hours)
**Dynamic IP Addresses**

- For each /24, count:
  - total number of unique IP addresses seen ever
  - maximum number seen in 2 hour periods

- On plot:
  - x-axis is total number of unique addresses seen ever
  - y-axis is maximum number for a 2 hour period
  - the x = y (total = max) line shows /24s that had all their vulnerable hosts actively spreading in same 2 hour period, and those hosts didn’t change IP addresses
  - the space far below and to the right of the x = y line (total >> max) shows /24s that appear to have a lot of dynamic addresses
  - color of points represents density (3d histogram)
DHCP Effect seen in /24s

IP Addresses per Subnet

Maximum Number of IP Addresses Active per 2 Hours per Subnet

Total Unique IP Addresses per Subnet
Witty Scan Rate

The diagram shows the Witty Worm Global View, depicting the unique IP addresses as a percentage of the CDF (Cumulative Distribution Function) over packets per second (average per IP address). The x-axis represents packets per second, with values ranging from 0.1 to 100000, and the y-axis represents unique IP addresses as a percentage of the CDF, ranging from 0 to 100. The data points are labeled with bit rates such as 55k, 128k, 384k, 1.5M, 10M, and 100M, indicating different infection rates. The timestamp at the bottom right of the graph is Sat Mar 20 18:01 - 19:01 UTC.
Witty Worm Scan Rate

• Like the earlier SQL Slammer worm, Witty hosts send UDP packets at line rate

• Wide variation in the scan rate of infected machines
  – From <1 pps to ~10,000 pps
  – From <14 kbps to >100 Mbps
  – 53% of hosts in range 128 – 512 kpbs (15-60 pps)
    • Cablemodem and DSL users
  – Overall average: 3 Mbps (357pps)
  – Average at peak scanning rate: 8 Mbps (970 pps)
  – Maximum scan rate: 23,500 pps sustained for more than an hour
Early Growth of Witty (3 days)
Witty Worm Decay
March 19, 2004

• 75% of hosts deactivated within 24 hours
  – Unprecedented response
    • Better coordination from network security and IT personnel
    • Majority of the impact results from destructive worm payload damaging to infected machines
  – Dynamic addressing limits the duration of many attacks
    • User perceptions (“my Internet is broken”, “my computer is slow”) can cause reboot and can result in a new IP address
    • NAT use also a significant factor (aggregates victims, rewrites packet headers
  – Traffic filtering artificially limits our view of infection duration (but we do accurately record the interval for which an infected machine is dangerous to others)
Witty Infection Durations
Witty Worm Victims

• Consistent with past worms:
  – Globally distributed
  – Majority high-bandwidth home/small business users

• Unique
  – 100% taking proactive security measures
  – Infected via software they ran purposefully
## Witty Worm Victims

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>26.28</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>7.27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3.46</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3.36</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.94</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
<td>2.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1.36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TLD</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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<td>com</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>net</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no-DNS</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>fr</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>jp</td>
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<td>nl</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ar</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Geographic Spread of Witty

![Graph showing the geographic spread of Witty worm](image-url)
Witty Animation…
Conclusions (1)

- Witty incorporates a number of novel and disturbing features:
  - Next day exploit for publicized bug
  - Wide-scale deployment
  - Successful exploit of small population (no more security through obscurity)
  - Future worms will continue to emulate botnets – increasing levels of stealth and flexibility
  - Infected a *security* product
Conclusions (2)

• Witty demonstrates conclusively that the patch model of networked device security has failed
  – You can’t encourage people to sign on to the ‘net with one click and then also expect them to be security experts
  – Running commercial firewall software at their own expense is the gold standard for end user behavior
    • Recognition that security is important
    • Recognition that they can’t do it themselves
Conclusions (3)

• End-user behavior cannot solve current software security problems
• End-user behavior cannot effectively mitigate current software security problems
• We must:
  – Actively address prevention of software vulnerabilities
  – Turn our attention to developing large-scale, robust, reliable infrastructure that can mitigate current security problems without end-user intervention
Acknowledgements

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  - Brian Kantor, Jim Madden, and Pat Wilson
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  - Cisco PSIRT Team, Wendy Garvin, Team Cymru, Nicholas Weaver, Vern Paxson, Mike Gannis, and Stefan Savage
- Support for this work was provided by: Cisco Systems, NSF, DARPA, DHS, and CAIDA members
Current Events…

– Q. Should the federal government be doing more to stop and prevent spam, viruses, and worms? If so, what?
– John Kerry: Absolutely. In particular, worms and viruses are causing economic losses of billions of dollars a year. Experts have argued that future worms could allow attackers to rapidly control millions of Internet-connected computers. They could then use those computers to launch "denial of service attacks," or steal and corrupt large quantities of sensitive information. Moreover, these worms could reach most vulnerable targets in an hour or less. We need a president who is actively supportive of developing technologies that will automatically detect and respond to these kinds of attacks.
**More Information**

- **Witty:**
  - ISS vulnerability release: [http://xforce.iss.net/xforce/alerts/id/166](http://xforce.iss.net/xforce/alerts/id/166)
  - Witty code analysis: [http://www.lurhq.com/witty.html](http://www.lurhq.com/witty.html)

- **Other worm research:**
Related Papers

- Inferring Internet Denial-of-Service Activity [MSV01]
  - David Moore, Stefan Savage, Geoff Voelker

- Code-Red: A Case Study on the spread and victims of an Internet Worm [MSB02]
  - David Moore, Colleen Shannon, Jeffrey Brown

- Internet Quarantine: Requirements for Containing Self-Propagating Code [MSVS03]
  - David Moore, Colleen Shannon, Geoff Voelker, Stefan Savage

- The Spread of the Sapphire/Slammer Worm [MPS03]
  - David Moore, Vern Paxson, Stefan Savage, Colleen Shannon, Stuart Staniford, Nicholas Weaver
Additional Information

- Code-Red v1, Code-Red v2, CodeRedII, Nimda

- Code-Red v2 In-depth analysis

- Spread of the Sapphire/SQL Slammer Worm

- Network telescopes