





disclaimer: half-baked ideas

## Biggest DDoS Attack on Record Hits Github

The IT infrastructure that powered Wednesday's attack is ripe for abuse, security firms say.



By Michael Kan March 1, 2018 7:40PM EST





#### Bigges Githuh

The IT infrastructu





#### US service provider survives the biggest recorded DDoS in history

Nearly 100,000 memcached servers are imperiling the stability of the Internet.

DAN GOODIN - 3/5/2018, 1:24 PM








# NETSCOUT Arbor Confirms 1.7 Tbps DDoS Attack; The Terabit Attack Era Is Upon Us

Carlos Morales on March 5, 2018.



y of the Internet.



### Brazil hit by 30 DDoS attacks per hour in 2017

The country is part of a global ranking of the five nations most targeted by cybercriminals, says study.

By Angelica Mari for Brazil Tech | February 21, 2018 -- 14:59 GMT (06:59 PST) | Topic: Security

#### Terabit Attack Era is upon us

Carlos Morales on March 5, 2018.



## IP spoofing is a well-known problem

a key component of such DDoS attacks



#### addressing spoofing

- attempts to eliminate spoofing, not adopted
- IETF BCPs 38-84, ISOC MANRS
- scrubbing centers (eg Akamai, Cloudflare, Level 3 Anti-DDoS)
- measure use of source address validation (against spoofing)
- the Spoofer project



# methodology and corresponding tools to detect spoofed traffic in network traces

enable SAV compliance tests for **IXP** networks



#### more on expected results

- methodology and the analysis results of the prevalence, causes, and impact of IP source spoofing (observed in IXPs)
- create a tool that enables IXPs to perform compliance tests on SAV, make it available to networking community
- longitudinal measurement about adoption of SAV and filtering after we deployed our tool



#### what could go wrong?





#### what could go wrong?

- no collaboration from network operators
- no access to commercial traffic and client information
- coarse-grained data only, eg no flow information
- anonymized data
- overwhelming resource demands to transfer, storage and process data



#### current status

- access to detailed data from a large IXP
- expanding access to other vantage points
- developing a processing pipeline: transformation and processing (filtering and classification) of (i) bogon,
   (ii) unrouted, and (iii) AS-specific traffic




where could we apply this?



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#### Brazilian IX.br ecosystem


- over 5.3k ASes
- 30 IXPs unevenly distributed in 27 states
- total of ~2,300 member ASes,
   ~1,650 distinct ones
- ~102 colocation facilities (directly connected to the IX.br)
- ~4.4 Tb/s average traffic peak over the last 30 days for all IX.br ecosystem



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### ix.br daily traffic breakdown



#### we need validation

- scientific contribution?
- confirm/challenge previous work?
- perform IPv6 analysis?
- correlate with IPv4 space grey-market address transfers?
- locate and investigate malicious ASes in BGP AS-Path?
- security hygiene best practices?
- ...



## Using IXPs to Measure Improvements in Source Address Validation Filtering of Inter-Domain Traffic

Lucas Muller, **Marinho Barcellos**, Bradley Huffaker, Matthew Luckie, kc claffy

**AIMS 2018** 

