




ITER:
**A Computational Model to Evaluate
Provider and Peer Selection
in the Internet Ecosystem**

Amogh Dhamdhere (CAIDA)
Constantine Dovrolis (Georgia Tech)





Provider/peer selection strategies







High-level questions in this research



- Networks rewire their connectivity (select providers and peers) to optimize an objective function (typically profit)
 - Distributed
 - Localized **spatially** and **temporally**
- **What are the local implications of provider and peer selection strategies for the involved ASes?**
- **What are the global, long-term effects of these distributed optimizations for the whole Internet?**
 - Topology and traffic flow
 - Economics
 - Performance (path lengths)



Our model of interdomain network formation (ITER)



- Compute the "attractors" of this dynamical system
 - Point attractor: When no network has the incentive to change its connectivity
 - Limit cycles: an oscillation between a number of network topologies



Approach



- What is the outcome when networks use certain provider and peer selection strategies?
- Model the Internet ecosystem as a dynamic system
 - Real-world economics of transit, peering, operational costs
 - Realistic routing policies
 - Geographical constraints
 - Provider and peer selection strategies
- Compute attractors
 - Point attractors or limit cycles
- Measure properties of the steady-state
 - Topology, traffic flow, economics



Network Types



- Enterprise Customers (EC)
 - Stub networks at the edge (e.g. Georgia Tech)
 - Either sources or sinks
 - Small Transit Providers (STP)
 - Provide Internet transit
 - Mostly regional in presence (e.g. France Telecom)
 - Large Transit Providers (LTP)
 - Transit providers with global presence (e.g. AT&T)
 - Content Providers (CP)
 - Major sources of content (e.g. Google)
- Provider and peer selection for STPs and LTPs



What would happen if..?



- The traffic matrix consists of mostly P2P traffic?
- P2P traffic benefits STPs, can make LTPs unprofitable
- LTPs peer with content providers?
- LTPs could harm STP profitability, at the expense of longer end-to-end paths
- Edge networks choose providers using path lengths?
- LTPs would be profitable and end-to-end paths shorter




Provider and Peer Selection




- Provider selection strategies
 - Minimize monetary cost (PR)
 - Minimize AS path lengths weighted by traffic (PF)
 - Avoid selecting competitors as providers (SEL)
- Peer selection strategies
 - Peer only if necessary to maintain reachability (NC)
 - Peer if traffic ratios are balanced (TR)
 - Peer by cost-benefit analysis (CB)
- Peer and provider selection are related



Provider and Peer Selection are Related



- Restrictive peering



- Peering by necessity
- Level3-Cogent peering dispute



Economics, Routing and Traffic Matrix



- Realistic transit, peering and operational costs
 - Transit prices based on data from Norton
 - Economies of scale
- BGP-like routing policies
 - No-valley, prefer customer, prefer peer routing policy
- Traffic matrix
 - Heavy-tailed content popularity and consumption by sinks
 - Predominantly client-server: Traffic from CPs to ECs
 - Predominantly peer-to-peer: Traffic between ECs



Algorithm for network actions



- Networks perform their actions sequentially
- Can observe the actions of previous networks
 - And the effects of those actions
- Network actions in each move
 - Pick set of preferred providers
 - Attempt to convert provider links to peering links "due to necessity"
 - Evaluate each existing peering link
 - Evaluate new peering links
- Networks make at most one change to their set of peers in a single move



Solving the Model



- Determine the outcome as each network selects providers and peers according to its strategy
- Too complex to solve analytically: Solve computationally
- Typical computation
 - Proceeds iteratively, networks act in a predefined sequence
 - Pick next node n to “play” its possible moves
 - Compute routing, traffic flow, AS fitness
 - Repeat until no player has incentive to move (point attractor)
 - Or until we have detected a limit cycle



Properties of the steady-state



- Do we always reach a point attractor?
 - Yes, in most cases (but see paper for some cases of limit cycles)
- Is point attractor unique?
 - No, it can depend on playing sequence and initial conditions
 - But, different attractors have statistically similar properties
- Multiple runs with different playing sequences
 - Average over different runs
 - Confidence intervals are narrow




Canonical Model



- Parameterization of the model that resembles real world
- Traffic matrix is predominantly client-server (80%)
 - Impact of streaming video, centralized file sharing services
- 20% of ECs are content sources, 80% sinks
- Heavy tailed popularity of traffic sources
- Edge networks choose providers based on price
- 5 geographical regions
- STPs cheaper than LTPs





Results - Canonical Model



- Hierarchy of STPs
- Traffic can bypass LTPs - LTPs unprofitable
- STPs should not peer with CPs
 - CPs choose STPs as providers




Results - Canonical Model



- What-if: LTPs peer with CPs
- Generate revenue from downstream traffic
- Can harm STP fitness
- Long paths




Deviation 1: P2P Traffic matrix



- P2P traffic helps STPs
- Smaller traffic volume from CPs to ECs
- More EC-EC traffic => balanced traffic ratios
- More opportunities for STPs to peer



Peering Federation



- Traditional peering links: **Not transitive**
- Peering federation of A, B, C: **Allows mutual transit**
 - Longer chain of "free" traffic
- Incentives to join peering federation?
- What happens to tier-1 providers if smaller providers form federations?






Conclusions



- A model that captures the feedback loop between topology, traffic and fitness in the Internet
- Considers effects of
 - Economics
 - Geography
 - Heterogeneity in network types
- Predict the effects of provider and peer selection strategies
 - Topology, traffic flow, economics, and performance




Model Validation



- Reproduces almost constant average path length
- Activity frequency: How often do networks change their connectivity?
 - ECs less active than providers - Qualitatively similar to measurement results



Previous Work



- **Static graph properties**
 - No focus on how the graph evolves
- **"Descriptive" modeling**
 - Match graph properties e.g. degree distribution
- **Homogeneity**
 - Nodes and links all the same
- **Game theoretic, computational**
 - Restrictive assumptions
- **Dynamics of the evolving graph**
 - Birth/death
 - Rewiring
- **"Bottom-up"**
 - Model the actions of individual networks
- **Heterogeneity**
 - Networks with different incentives
 - Semantics of interdomain links