
### IMC

#### 14-16 November, 2012 - Boston, MA

## Analysis of a "/O" Stealth Scan from a Botnet

A. Dainotti, A. King, K. Claffy, F. Papale\*, A. Pescapè\* alberto@caida.org CAIDA - University of California, San Diego \*University of Napoli Federico II, Italy



## THE "SIPSCAN" Feb 2011


• A ''/O'' scan from a botnet

 Scanning SIP Servers with a specific query on UDP port 5060 and SYNs on TCP port 80

2011-02-02 12:15:18.913184 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 36, id 20335, offset 0, flags [none], proto UDP (17), length 412) XX.10.100.90.1878 > XX .164.30.56.5060: [udp sum ok] SIP, length: 384 REGISTER sip:3982516068@XX.164.30.56 SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP XX.164.30.56:5060; branch=1F8b5C6T44G2CJt; rport Content-Length: 0 From: <sip:3982516068@XX.164.30.56>; tag =1471813818402863423218342668 Accept: application/sdp User-Agent: Asterisk PBX To: <sip:3982516068@XX.164.30.56> Contact: sip:3982516068@XX.164.30.56 CSeq: 1 REGISTER Call-ID: 4731021211 Max-Forwards: 70



## DARKNET The UCSD Network Telescope







# OVERVIEW

isolating the "SipScan"

• Thanks to the unique payload fingerprint we could isolate it without inferences





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# OVERVIEW

#### some quick statistics

# of probes (1 probe = 1 UDP + multiple TCP pkts)	20,255,721		
#of source IP addresses	2,954,108		
# of destination IP addresses	14,534,793		
% of telescope IP space covered	86,6%		
# of unique couples (source IP - destination IP)	20,241,109		
max probes per second	78.3		
max # of distinct source IPs in 1 hour	160,264		
max # of distinct source IPs in 5 minutes	21,829		
average # of probes received by a /24	309		
max # of probes received by a /24	442		
average # of sources targeting a destination	1.39		
max # of sources targeting a destination	14		
average # of destinations a source targets	6.85		
max # of destination a source targets	17613		



# **RELWORKS**

#### • Analyses of botnet scans

small botnets, small dark/honeynets, no coordination!

- Z. Li, A. Goyal, Y. Chen, V. Paxson "Towards Situational Awareness of Large-scale Botnet Probing Events", IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics & Security, March 2011 (earlier version in Proc. ASIACCS, Mar. 2009.)

- Z. Li, A. Goyal, Y., Chen, "Honeynet-based Botnet Scan Traffic Analysis", Book Botnet characterization of Detection (Adv. in Inf Sec.) 2008

#### Botnet code analysis

- P. Barford, V. Yegneswaran, "An Inside Look at Botnets", Special Workshop on Malware Detection, Advances in Information Security, Springer Verlag, 2006

- P. Bacher, T. Holz, M. Kotter, and G. Wicherski, "*Know your Enemy: Tracking Botnets*," http://www.honeynet.org/papers/bots. 2008

show simple scanning strategies

don't observe.

they propose

#### Coordinated scans


- S. Staniford, V. Paxson, N. Weaver, "How to Own the Internet in Your Spare Time", Usenix Sec. Symp. 2002

- Carrie Gates, "Coordinated Scan Detection", NDSS 2009
- Y. Zhang and B. Bhargava. "Allocation schemes, Architectures, and Policies for Collaborative Port Scanning Attack.", Journal of Emerging Technologies in Web Intelligence, May 2011

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
## UNSPOOFED the "Egyptian Killswitch" (Feb 2011)

• No SipScan pkts are geolocated to Egypt during the Egyptian outage!



A. Dainotti, C. Squarcella, E. Aben, K. Claffy, M. Chiesa, M. Russo, and A. Pescapè, "Analysis of Country-wide Internet Outages Caused by Censorship", ACM SIGCOMM Internet Measurement Conference 2011

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20.0k-18.0k-16.0k-

14.0k-12.0k-10.0k-8.00k-

6.00k-

4.00k-


3 4

7 8 9 10 11 12

hosts

Animation created with an improved version of Cuttlefish, developed by **Brad Huffaker** http://www.caida.org/tools/visualization/cuttlefish/


### 10 SCAN DShield





Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis University of California San Diego http://www.dshield.org

### 10 SCAN MAWI/WIDE




• We identified flow-level properties (e.g. I pkt + PS size) that allowed to spot the same traffic in MAWI/WIDE traces, which are anonymized.

• A few different /8 networks were found in the MAWI traffic associated with the Sipscan



Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis University of California San Diego http://mawi.wide.ad.jp/mawi/

## /O SCAN Exploiting source port continuity



Date (UTC)



## HILBERT CURVE

http://xkcd.com/195


15 16

3 14 13

8 9 12

7 10 11

calda



# Hilbert to the reader HILBERT CURVE

#### Heatmaps


• The I-dimensional IPv4 address space is mapped into a 2dimensional image using a Hilbert curve


• CIDR netblocks always appear as squares or rectangles in the image.

0		1		26	10	20	21	234	235	236	239	240	241	254	255
R		13	22			25)	22	233	232	237	238	243	242	253	252
		e	11	30	29		25	230	231	226	225	<mark>2</mark> 44	247	248	251
6	5	9	20	S I	28	27	26	229	228	227	224	245	246	249	250
50	57/	54	5	372	35	36	37	218	219	220	223	202	201	198	197
59	56	50	52	36	34	39	33	217	216	221	222	203	200	199	196
60	61	50	51	46	45	4(8)	41	214	215	210	209	204	205	<b>19</b> 4	195
68	672	40	48	47		43	42	213	212	211	208	207	206	193	192
64	67/	68	69	1 7 JP).	123	124	127	128	131	132	133	186	187	188	191
65	66	70	70	121	120	125	126	129	130	135	134	185	184	189	190
7/8		72	73	1113	119		115	142	141	136	137	182	183	178	177
79	76	75	74	11.177	116		1102	143	140	139	138	181	180	179	176
80	81	94	95	96	97	1.10	1111	144	145	158	159	160	161	174	175
38	82	98	92	99	08	169	108	147	146	157	156	163	162	173	172
84	37	83	91	100	103	104	107	148	151	152	155	164	167	168	171
85	86	89	90	101	102	105	106	149	150	153	154	165	166	169	170

Software for hilbert-based IP heatmaps @ http://www.measurement-factory.com








# REVERSE BYTE ORDER


#### progression

#### 140.100.000






## BOT TURNOVER new src IPs arrive constantly





## BOT TURNOVER


most src IPs leave constantly





# COVERAGE & OVERLAP

different phases w/ different parameters?



#### Coverage




Overlap

Sinscan Source IPs

## COVERAGE & OVERLAP

different phases w/ different parameters?



University of California San Diego

packets per second

calda

# SIPSCAN FEATURES

some are unique

- Operated by a botnet
- Global vs Global
- Observed by a /8
- No inferences on pkts: unique payload "signature"
- Lasting 12 days
- Sequential progression in reverse byte order
- Continuous use of new bots
- Stealth: IP progression, speed, use of new bots
- Coordination between sources (global sequential progression and small redundancy)
- Targeting SIP



# THANKS

