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Analysis of an Internet-wide Stealth Scan from a Botnet

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

THE "SIPSCAN"

Feb 2011

- A "/0" scan from a botnet
- Scanning SIP Servers with a specific query on UDP port 5060 and SYNs on TCP port 80

```
2011-02-02 12:15:18.913184 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 36, id 20335, offset 0,
    flags [none], proto UDP (17), length 412) XX.10.100.90.1878 > XX
    .164.30.56.5060: [udp sum ok] SIP, length: 384
     REGISTER sip:3982516068@XX.164.30.56 SIP/2.0
     Via: SIP/2.0/UDP XX.164.30.56:5060;branch=1F8b5C6T44G2CJt;rport
     Content-Length: 0
     From: <sip:3982516068@XX.164.30.56>; tag
         =14718138184028634232183426668
     Accept: application/sdp
     User-Agent: Asterisk PBX
     To: <sip:3982516068@XX.164.30.56>
     Contact: sip:3982516068@XX.164.30.56
     CSeq: 1 REGISTER
     Call-ID: 4731021211
     Max-Forwards: 70
```

DARKNET

The UCSD Network Telescope



OVERVIEW

isolating the "SipScan"

- Thanks to the unique payload fingerprint we could isolate it without inferences



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

OVERVIEW

some quick statistics

# of probes (1 probe = 1 UDP + multiple TCP pkts)	20,255,721
#of source IP addresses	2,954,108
# of destination IP addresses	14,534,793
% of telescope IP space covered	86,6%
# of unique couples (source IP - destination IP)	20,241,109
max probes per second	78.3
max # of distinct source IPs in 1 hour	160,264
max # of distinct source IPs in 5 minutes	21,829
average # of probes received by a /24	309
max # of probes received by a /24	442
average # of sources targeting a destination	1.39
max # of sources targeting a destination	14
average # of destinations a source targets	6.85
max # of destination a source targets	17613

REL WORKS

- **Analyses of botnet scans**

  - Z. Li, A. Goyal, Y. Chen, V. Paxson "*Towards Situational Awareness of Large-scale Botnet Probing Events*", IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics & Security, March 2011 (earlier version in Proc. ASIACCS, Mar. 2009.)

  - Z. Li, A. Goyal, Y,. Chen, "*Honeynet-based Botnet Scan Traffic Analysis*", Book Botnet Detection (Adv. in Inf Sec.) 2008

small botnets, small dark/honeynets, no coordination!

characterization of botnet population

- **Botnet code analysis**

  - P. Barford, V. Yegneswaran, *"An Inside Look at Botnets"*, Special Workshop on Malware Detection, Advances in Information Security, Springer Verlag, 2006

  - P. Bacher, T. Holz, M. Kotter, and G. Wicherski, "*Know your Enemy: Tracking Botnets*," http://www.honeynet.org/papers/bots. 2008

show simple scanning strategies

- **Coordinated scans**

  - S. Staniford, V. Paxson, N. Weaver, "*How to 0wn the Internet in Your Spare Time*", Usenix Sec. Symp. 2002

  - Carrie Gates, "*Coordinated Scan Detection*", NDSS 2009

  - Y. Zhang and B. Bhargava. "*Allocation schemes, Architectures, and Policies for Collaborative Port Scanning Attack*.", Journal of Emerging Technologies in Web Intelligence, May 2011

don't observe. they propose

COORDINATION

(lack of)

- Z. Li, A. Goyal, Y. Chen, V. Paxson "*Towards Situational Awareness of Large-scale Botnet Probing Events*", IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics & Security, March 2011

- *"By analyzing the source code of five popular families of bots we studied different dimensions of scan strategies employed by botnets. [..]* ***Overall, we find they employ simple scanning strategies****."*

- *"Our dataset analysis accords with the above capabilities: most scanners we observe either use* ***simple sequential scanning*** *(IP address increments by one between scans) or* ***independent uniform random scanning****."*

COORDINATION

..and Redundancy

- Z. Li, A. Goyal, Y. Chen, V. Paxson "*Towards Situational Awareness of Large-scale Botnet Probing Events*", IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics & Security, March 2011

- *"Redundancy. Since the bots in a botnet can readily be lost due to detection or due to the host computer going offline, the botmaster will prefer instructing* ***multiple bots to scan the same addresses.***"

- *a simple and effective approach is to* ***ask each bot to independently scan the specified range in a random uniform fashion.*** *[..] In the source code analysis we find the most popular such one implemented to date (four out of five bot families implemented this strategy).*

- Assumptions in the extrapolation of global properties:
"[..].. second. ***each sender has the same global scan scope.***
[...] ***We argue that these two fundamental assumption likely apply to any local-to-global extrapolation scheme***.

UNSPOOFED

Because...

- It seems to be a scan (UDP requests + TCP SYNs).

No purpose in spoofing

- No IPs from our /8 or from unassigned space
- IPIDs and src ports from scanning hosts are consistent for the same host
- Egyptian outage: we were actually not seeing "egyptian" IPs when the Egypt was isolated from the rest of the Internet

UNSPOOFED

the "Egyptian Killswitch" (Feb 2011)

- *No SipScan pkts are geolocated to Egypt during the Egyptian outage!*



A. Dainotti, C. Squarcella, E. Aben, K. Claffy, M. Chiesa, M. Russo, and A. Pescapè, "Analysis of Country-wide Internet Outages Caused by Censorship", ACM SIGCOMM Internet Measurement Conference 2011

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



Animation created with an improved version of Cuttlefish, developed by ***Brad Huffaker***
http://www.caida.org/tools/visualization/cuttlefish/

/0 SCAN

DShield



/0 SCAN

MAWI/WIDE



- We identified flow-level properties (e.g. 1 pkt + PS size) that allowed to spot the same traffic in MAWI/WIDE traces, which are anonymized.
- A few different /8 networks were found in the MAWI traffic associated with the Sipscan

SOURCE PORT CONTINUITY

(in theory)

- consider a single host
- using standard sockets for opening each new TCP connection or UDP session
- a new source port is assigned to each new connection/session
- on some operating systems of the Microsoft Windows family, the source port assigned is obtained by incrementing a **global counter**: *Src_port++ in range 1025 - 5000*
- At the telescope: by looking at the "difference" between the source ports of two subsequent packets from the same bot we can infer how many connections/sessions it opened in between them
- If the bot probes at each round all the 256 /8 networks then we expect this difference to be 512

/0 SCAN

Exploiting source port continuity

- Src_port++ in range 1025 - 5000

- ~512 average increments between 2 "visits" to the telescope



HILBERT CURVE

http://xkcd.com/195

xkcd







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HILBERT CURVE

Heatmaps

- The 1-dimensional IPv4 address space is mapped into a 2-dimensional image using a Hilbert curve
- CIDR netblocks always appear as squares or rectangles in the image.

Software for hilbert-based IP heatmaps @ http://www.measurement-factory.com

Hosts per location:

1	
3- 5	
6- 12	
30- 69	
70- 163	
384- 898	
899-2.11k	

Packets per location:

1	
3- 5	
6- 12	
31- 73	
74- 176	
423-1.01k	
1.01k-2.40k	

2011-01-31 21:07 UTC Monday

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Global:



Target Hosts (X.b.c.d/8)

REVERSE BYTE ORDER

progression

X.*.*.0

Hosts per location:

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

Target Hosts (X.b.c.d/8)

Target Hosts (X.d.c.b/8) (reverse-engineered)

BOT TURNOVER

*new src IPs **arrive** constantly*



BOT TURNOVER

*most src IPs **leave** constantly*



BOT TURNOVER

*few src IPs **stay** for a while*

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COVERAGE & OVERLAP

different phases w/ different parameters?





Coverage

Overlap

COVERAGE & OVERLAP

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

COVERAGE & OVERLAP

"probes sent to reverse /16 subnets"

- Example of a reverse /16: **.*.45.123*
- From the UCSD Telescope we can see only pkts to *xxx.*.45.123*



SIPSCAN FEATURES

some are unique

- Operated by a botnet
- Global vs Global
- Observed by a /8
- No inferences on pkts: unique payload "signature"
- Lasting 12 days
- Sequential progression in *reverse byte order*
- Continuous use of new bots
- Stealth: IP progression, speed, use of new bots
- Coordination between sources (global sequential progression and small redundancy)
- Targeting SIP

THANKS



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