# A COORDINATED VIEW OF LARGE-SCALE INTERNET EVENTS

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## LARGE-SCALE INTERNET EVENTS (our focus)

- Events that impact services for a significant section of the Internet
  - Multiple networks/providers
  - Widespread geographic/human impact
- E.g. outages due to Hurricane Sandy; Tohoku Earthquake; malicious scans/ attacks; routing hijacks; etc.





## EVENTVIEWS (dimensions)

#### I.Geographic

City, State, Country, etc

#### 2.Network Traffic

- # packets, # bytes, # sources, etc
- Visualized using the Cuttlefish tool

http://www.caida.org/tools/visualization/cuttlefish/



## EVENTVIEWS (dimensions)

#### **3.Internet Address Space**

- IP address, Address Ranges, Autonomous Systems, etc
- Visualized using ipv4-heatmap tool
- Hilbert space-filling curve

#### all three dimensions evolve over time



http://maps.measurement-factory.com/software



## COORDINATED VIEW (putting it all together)

- Combine views into a single frame
- Synchronized by time
- Each view augments information shown in others
- Whole is greater than the sum of the parts





## CASE STUDIES (trying it out)

- Two Case Studies:
  - The sipscan
  - Egypt Internet Blackout
- Data captured by the UCSD Network Telescope (darknet)
  - Sipscan data available at <u>http://www.caida.org/data/passive/sipscan\_dataset.xml</u>
  - Egypt Internet Blackout data will be released as part of an Educational Dataset at the end of 2012



## DARKNETS (or, Network Telescopes)



## THE SIPSCAN (a case study)

- ''/O'' scan from a **botnet**
- February 2011
- Scanning SIP servers with a query on UDP port 5060

A. Dainotti, A. King, K. Claffy, F. Papale, A. Pescapè, "Analysis of a "/0" Stealth Scan from a Botnet", ACM SIGCOMM Internet Measurement Conference 2012



# THE SIPSCAN

(why was it interesting?)

- Covered the entire IPv4 address space (in I2 days)
- Highly Coordinated
  - Small overlap in targets probed
  - Good coverage
- Stealthy
  - Large turnover of geographically distributed bots
  - Reverse byte order increment of target IP



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Target Hosts (X.b.c.d/8)



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## EGYPTIAN INTERNET BLACKOUT (another example)

- Egyptian government ordered Internet censorship
- Most BGP routes to Egyptian networks withdrawn
- 5 days beginning January 27 2011

A. Dainotti, C. Squarcella, E. Aben, K. C. Claffy, M. Chiesa, M. Russo, and A. Pescapé. "Analysis of country-wide internet outages caused by censorship." ACM SIGCOMM Internet Measurement Conference 2012

## EGYPTIAN INTERNET BLACKOUT (and why it is interesting)

#### • Internet access was denied to an entire country ... even to the malware

Conficker-infected hosts can no longer send packets











AfriNIC Sources (41.8.8.8/8)

# CONCLUSIONS

- Applied several Information Visualization techniques to large-scale Internet events.
- Used Multiple Coordinated Views to study temporal evolution along different dimensions.
- Potentially allows insights individual views do not



FUTURE WORK (where are we going with this?)

- Develop additional views/dimensions to include
- Integrate into near-realtime reporting system for Telescope
- Leverage web frameworks (e.g. D3) for interactive viz
- Improve signal to noise ratio by utilizing different geographic aggregation methods (e.g. Voronoi diagrams)

### QUESTIONS? (suggestions?)

#### Animations are available at:

http://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2012/ coordinated view internet events/supplemental/



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