




CAIDA update

PI k claffy, CAIDA
ISI/USC

Marina del Rey, CA
10 February 2017



caida

- **Data collection activities**
 - Ongoing measurements
 - Data storage status
 - Data dissemination statistics
 - Recent publications
- **Related other activities**
 - New data infrastructure
 - Related research activities
- **Open issues**
 - Portal, New Data Types

- **Ark Platform (as of Sept 2016)**
 - 170 monitors in 59 countries
 - 74 IPv6-enabled
 - 124 Raspberry PIs
- **UCSD Network Telescope**
 - As of January 2017, captures more than 1TB of compressed traffic trace data per day.
 - 28 TB: last full month (Aug 2016)
 - 182 TB: 2015
 - 211 TB: YTD 2016 (as of 9/13/16)
 - 288 TB: last 12 months at NERSC (as of 9/13/16)
 - 703 TB: total archived at NERSC

CAIDA Datasets/Requests

Datasets	Requests
Active Toplogy Measurements w/ Skitter	0
OC48 Peering Point Traces	3
Backscatter	10 (4 rejected)
DDoS 2007 Attack Dataset	3 (1 rejected)
IPv4 2013 Census Dataset	3
IPv4 Routed /24 Topology	0
IPv4 Routed /24 DNS Names	0
IPv6 Topology	0
Internet Topology Data Kits (ITDK)	2 (1 withdrawn)
Patch Tuesday Dataset	3 (1 rejected)
Three Days of Conficker Dataset	4
Two-Days-in-2008 Telescope Dataset	3 (1 rejected)
UCSD Real-time Network Telescope Dataset	5 (1 rejected, 3
UCSD Telescope Darknet Scanners Dataset	7 (1 rejected)
Witty Worm	2

New and Upcoming Data Sets

- (2) Macroscopic Internet Topology Data Kit (ITDK)
<http://www.caida.org/data/internet-topology-data-kit/>
- IPv4 2013 Census Dataset
http://www.caida.org/data/active/ipv4_2013_census_dataset.xml
(available from IMPACT only)
- UCSD Network Telescope -- Darknet Scanners Dataset
http://www.caida.org/data/passive/telescope-darknet-scanners_dataset.xml
(available from IMPACT only)
- AS Border Mapping Dataset (coming soon)
<http://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2016/bdrmap/>
- AS to Facilities Dataset (coming soon)
- Spoofer data

Statistics for publications that make use of the UCSD Network Telescope
Dataset 2005-2016.

<http://www.caida.org/data/publications/bydataset/index.xml#UCSD Network Telescope>

UCSD Network Telescope	102
backscatter-2004-2005	8
backscatter-2006	4
backscatter-2007	8
backscatter-2008	17
backscatter-generic	4
backscatter-tics	3
code-red worm	7
code-red-generic	2
telescope-2days-2008	12
telescope-3days-conficker	14
telescope-educational	3
telescope-generic	7
telescope-patch-tuesday	2
telescope-real-time	5
witty worm (public)	1
witty worm (restricted)	17
witty-generic	6

Tools under consideration

- Vela: On-Demand Topology Measurement Service of CAIDA's Ark infrastructure
 - Web interface <https://vela.caida.org/>
 - Command-Line interface

traceroute to 200.136.34.2 (sao2-br.ark.caida.org) from **bjc-us** of *commercial network (6)* using ICMP

Hop	Address	Prefix	AS	Location	RTT (ms)
1	unknown.Level3.net 209.245.28.1	209.244.0.0/14	3356	broomfield, co usa	0.3
2	ge-5-0-48.hsa2.Denver1.Level3.net 209.245.29.226	209.244.0.0/14	3356	denver, co usa	0.8
3	ge-7-36.car2.Denver1.Level3.net 4.69.200.66	4.0.0.0/9	3356	denver, co usa	1.9
4	vlan51.ebr1.Denver1.Level3.net 4.69.147.94	4.0.0.0/9	3356	denver, co usa	0.8
5	ae-2-2.ebr2.Dallas1.Level3.net 4.69.132.106	4.0.0.0/9	3356	dallas, tx usa	15.0
6	ae-72-72.csw2.Dallas1.Level3.net 4.69.151.141	4.0.0.0/9	3356	dallas, tx usa	15.0
7	ae-2-70.edge2.Dallas1.Level3.net 4.69.145.75	4.0.0.0/9	3356	dallas, tx usa	15.6
8	DATA-RETURN.edge2.Dallas1.Level3.net 4.71.220.70	4.0.0.0/9	3356	dallas, tx usa	15.1
9	g1-10.br1.dfw.terremark.net 66.165.160.249	66.165.160.0/19	23148	dallas, tx usa	47.1
10	66.165.161.33	66.165.160.0/19	23148	miami, fl usa	47.9
11	g0-5-0-1.br2.dfw3.terremark.net 66.165.161.238	66.165.160.0/19	23148	miami, fl usa	48.9
12	t0-0-0-7.br2.mia.terremark.net 66.165.161.229	66.165.160.0/19	23148	miami, fl usa	48.0
13	t9-1.gw1.mia.terremark.net 66.165.161.94	66.165.160.0/19	23148	miami, fl usa	46.8
14	66.165.175.26	66.165.160.0/19	23148	miami, fl usa	59.3
15	198.32.252.142	198.32.252.0/24	20080	marina del rey, ca usa	208.0
16	200.136.34.2	200.136.0.0/16	1251	sao paulo bra	208.0

Vela/Henya Web Interface to Topology Measurements and Data

Query Traces for IP Paths

Displays traceroute paths.

Query

Target Address/Prefix/AS/Country:

Second Target for *neigh* Query:

Separate multiple targets with commas.
Example: 1.2.3.4, 10.0.0.0/8, as1234, .sy

Start Date: End Date:

Dates can be YYYY, YYYY-MM, or YYYY-MM-DD. End date is exclusive.
Leave start/end (or both) blank for an open-ended range.

Query Method: ☒ dest ☐ addr ☐ neigh

dest — search by trace *destination* address

addr — search for *responding address* (hop or responding destination address)

neigh — search for *neighboring* addresses (responding hop or destination)

Target Position/Neighbor Separation: 0 Max Traces: 10 ☐ Reverse Order

positive position — hop distance relative to *beginning* of trace

negative position — hop distance relative to *end* of trace

neighbor **separation** — hop distance *between* neighboring targets

Vantage Point

By Name By Continent By Country By Org Type


Monitors with IPv6 have an asterisk next to their name.

Submit

Reset

- **Henya: Large-Scale Internet Topology Query System**


- Access via the Vela web interface <https://vela.caida.org/>
- 9 years of “Routed /24” trace routes
 - 47 billion traces in 20TB of files
 - growing yearly by 10 billion traces
- 1 year of “Prefix Probing” trace routes
 - growing yearly by 9 billion traces



Henrya Topology Queries

- find occurrences of traceroute path elements
- «targets» = IP addresses, prefixes, ASes, or countries
- Queries:
 - traceroutes toward «targets»
 - traceroutes containing one or more «targets»
- Parameters:
 - measurement vantage points
 - data collection time periods
 - position of «targets» in path
 - hop distance between sets of «targets»

- the most complex case:
 - traceroutes containing two or more «targets»
 - precisely: traceroutes containing some hop $h1 \in \langle\langle \text{targets1} \rangle\rangle$, $h2 \in \langle\langle \text{targets2} \rangle\rangle$, ...
 - example: traceroutes containing hops in both «Germany» and «Japan»




- harder:
 - traceroutes with hops in «Germany or UK or France» and hops in «ATT or Level3 network» and hops in «Amsterdam Internet Exchange»

Vela and Henya Access Policies

- Currently accepting requests for accounts on Vela
- Currently accepting requests for early access to Henya and a subset of total topology dataset.

Restricted Dataset Requests


received/approved requests for restricted datasets



* This graph now includes all passive traces (including OC192).
Previous graphs included only OC48 requests.


<http://www.caida.org/data/about/>

Users downloading public data



<http://www.caida.org/data/about/>

Users downloading restricted data




* This graph now includes all passive traces (including OC192).
Previous graphs included only OC48 downloads.

<http://www.caida.org/data/about/>


Public data downloaded

Amount of public data downloaded



Restricted data downloaded

Amount of restricted data downloaded



- drop in topology data in 2016 due to making topology data public

<http://www.caida.org/data/about/>

Recent Related R&D Activities

- DHS: Spoofing measurement
(spoofer.caida.org)
- New DHS project: Science of Internet Security: Technology and Experimental Research (SISTER)
- NSF: Internet Outage Detection and Analysis (IODA)
(ioda.caida.org)
- NSF: Internet congestion mapping system
(beamer.caida.org)

Software Systems for Surveying Spoofing Susceptibility

- DHS S&T funded project that seeks to minimize Internet's susceptibility to spoofed DDoS attacks
- Goal: develop, build, and operate multiple open-source software tools to assess and report on the deployment of source address validation (SAV) best anti-spoofing practices.
- **<https://spoofers.caida.org/>** ← **plz download now!**
- **Will share data through IMPACT**

Software Systems for Surveying Spoofing Susceptibility


Recent Tests

Result filters: ASNs: Country codes: ☐ Exclude NAT ☐ Only show spoofing

Session	Timestamp	Client IP	ASN	Country	NAT	Spoof Private	Spoof Routable	v4 Adjacency Spoofing	Results
73442	2016-09-28 11:57:32	62.195.64.x	6830 (LGI-UPC)		yes	rewritten	rewritten	none	Full report
73440	2016-09-28 11:57:10	37.235.60.x	57169 (EDIS-AS-EU)		no	blocked	received	/8	Full report
73439	2016-09-28 11:57:07	84.59.214.x	3209 (VODANET)		yes	blocked	blocked	none	Full report
73438	2016-09-28 11:51:56	95.90.233.x	31334 (KABELDEUTSCHLAND-AS)		yes	blocked	blocked	none	Full report
		2a02:8109::x	31334 (KABELDEUTSCHLAND-AS)		no	blocked	blocked		
73437	2016-09-28 11:49:27	91.14.132.x	3320 (DTAG)		yes	blocked	blocked	none	Full report
73435	2016-09-28 11:47:31	79.237.172.x	3320 (DTAG)		yes	rewritten	rewritten	none	Full report
		2003:86::x	3320 (DTAG)		no	blocked	blocked		
73434	2016-09-28 11:43:39	94.214.191.x	9143 (ZIGGO)		yes	blocked	blocked	none	Full report
73431	2016-09-28 11:36:16	70.196.30.x	22394 (CELLCO)	usa (United States)	yes	blocked	rewritten	none	Full report
		2600:100c::x	22394 (CELLCO)		no	blocked	blocked		
73429	2016-09-28 11:30:12	213.221.216.x	15600 (FINECOM)	che (Switzerland)	yes	blocked	blocked	none	Full report
73426	2016-09-28 11:21:08	122.252.250.x	24186 (RAILTEL-AS-IN)	ind (India)	yes	unknown	unknown	none	Full report
73424	2016-09-28 11:09:37	37.201.192.x	6830 (LGI-UPC)	deu (Germany)	yes	blocked	blocked	none	Full report
		2a02:908::x	6830 (LGI-UPC)		no	blocked	blocked		
73423	2016-09-28 11:08:43	128.151.13.x	20 (UR)	usa (United States)	no	unknown	unknown	none	Full report
73421	2016-09-28 11:06:25	91.154.254.x	719 (ELISA-AS)	fin (Finland)	no	unknown	unknown	none	Full report
73420	2016-09-28 10:56:58	47.29.88.x	55836 (RELIANCEJIO-IN)	ind (India)	yes	rewritten	rewritten	none	Full report
73419	2016-09-28 10:46:13	86.88.134.x	1136 (KPN)	nld (Netherlands)	yes	blocked	blocked	none	Full report
		204.235.114.x	2456 (TM-CABLE)	usa (United States)	yes	unknown	unknown		


http://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php

AMPLIFICATION ATTACK



The video will explain to a general audience the dangers of IP spoofing.

Working towards a
filtered tomorrow.



<http://spoofer.caida.org>

We will end the video with
a requester help.



Science of Internet Security: Technology


- Using the versatile Ark measurement platform, we will conduct measurements and analysis for documented explanations of structural and dynamic aspects of the Internet infrastructure relevant to cybersecurity vulnerabilities
 - Task 1: Support for Macroscopic Security and Stability Monitoring and Analysis
 - Task 2: Mapping Peering Interconnections at the Router Level
 - Task 3: Mapping Peering Interconnections at the Facility Level
 - Task 4: Measurements of TCP Behavior to Understand Security Vulnerabilities
 - Task 5: Identifying Grey Market IPv4 Address Transfers
 - Task 6: Internet Router-Level Topology Mapping on Demand

- **Task 1:**
 - IPv4 Prefix-Probing Dataset
http://www.caida.org/data/active/ipv4_prefix_probing_dataset.xml
- **Task 2:**
 - AS Border Mapping Dataset (February 2017)
- **Task 3:**
 - AS to Facilities Mapping Dataset (February 2017)
 - AS to Facilities Mapping Dataset annotated w/ approach to interconnection (private peering with cross-connect, public peering, private interconnects over the public switch fabric, and remote peering) (February/March 2017)
 - Alias resolved Interconnection (router-level map) (April 2017)
 - Global facility-aware map of interconnection (May 2017)


Detection and analysis of large-scale Internet infrastructure outages (IODA)

- Developing methods to infer location and extent of outages
- **Goals: (1) investigate and define strategies and methodologies to fuse diverse data sources to detect & characterize outages, (2) define and refine *system* requirements for continuous monitoring & (near) real-time analysis (3) testing & experimental deployment**
- Part of a 3 year NSF-funded SATC project

Detection and analysis of large-scale Internet infrastructure outages (IODA)



(a)




(b)


Libyan outages: (a) visibility of Libyan IPv4 prefixes in BGP (RouteViews, RIPE NCC RIS);
(b) unsolicited traffic to UCSD telescope from Libya.

IODA After Four Years (Today)


- Live detection and monitoring



- High-level system view




Mapping Interdomain Internet Congestion




- Developing methods to measure the location and extent of interdomain congestion
- **Goals (1) system to monitor interdomain links and their congestion state, (2) near real-time “congestion heat map” of the Internet, (3) increase transparency, empirical grounding of debate**
- Part of a 3 year NSF-funded project on topology+congestion


Measurement System



Mapping Interdomain Internet Congestion




Congestion seen between Comcast





Contact Information

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<http://www.caida.org/>



caida