

# Inferring a Nation's Inbound Route Diversity Using Country-Level Transit Influence of Autonomous Systems

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
Research in collaboration with: Esteban Carisimo, Shuai Hao, Bradley Huffaker,  
Amogh Dhamdhere, **Alex C. Snoeren** and **Alberto Dainotti**




Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis




# Why Study a Nation's Inbound Route Diversity?



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
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
## Peer ASes:

Exchange traffic with one another  
and one another's customers




# Why Study a Nation's Inbound Route Diversity?

## Healthy Ecosystem: Higher Route Diversity




## Unhealthy Ecosystem: Lower Route Diversity




- Identify countries with lower diversity
- Quantify route concentration

# Transit Concentration Exposes Country to Disconnections



# Transit Concentration Exposes Country to Observation





In countries with concentrated routes, some networks have the potential capability to *observe, manipulate and disrupt* Internet traffic flowing towards a country.

Security

## DDoS attack boots Kyrgyzstan from net

Russian bears blamed

By [Dan Goodin](#) 28 Jan 2009 at 19:57

6 SHARE ▼

The two primary Kyrgyzstan ISPs ([www.domain.kg](http://www.domain.kg), [www.ns.kg](http://www.ns.kg)) have been under a massive, sustained DDoS attack ... Few alternatives for Internet access exist in Kyrgyzstan. ... [the attacks] essentially knocked most of the small, Central Asian republic offline.

**BBC** Sign in News Sport Reel Worklife Travel Future

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## Pensioner in Georgia cuts Armenia off from internet

6 April 2011

Share

An elderly woman in Georgia is facing a prison sentence after reportedly causing internet services in neighbouring Armenia to crash.



Most vulnerable countries from anecdotal evidence are least represented in networking literature (e.g., Africa and Central Asia)

## Ethiopia has been offline, and nobody really knows why

By Samuel Getachew, CNN

Updated 4:32 PM ET, Mon June 17, 2019

**USNews** NEWS » News Best Countries Best States Healthiest Communities Cities The Report Photos Events

## How Ethiopia Controls the Internet

A one-week internet shutdown ends, but the government has more methods to silence online critics, a rights group says.


By Sintia Radu Staff Writer June 21, 2019, at 11:14 a.m.

Government control is facilitated by how internet connectivity works in Ethiopia. The country is landlocked and [connects to the internet via satellite](#), a fiber-optic cable that passes through Sudan and connects to the international gateway, and another cable that connects through Djibouti to an international undersea cable.


We built tools to identify  
countries with concentrated inbound routes

# First Sign of Concern on Route Diversity: Foreign Peering is Rare

## Healthy Ecosystem: Higher Route Diversity



## Unhealthy Ecosystem: Lower Route Diversity




Border Gateway Protocol (BGP): the system relied upon by network operators to announce and implement their routing policies.

We built tools to identify  
countries with concentrated inbound routes


Identify Countries with Lower Route Diversity:  
origin ASes generally do not have foreign  
peers and therefore **traffic flows through**  
**(often concentrated) transit links**

# First Sign of Concern on Route Diversity: Foreign Peering is Rare (Step 1)


Infer share of country's addresses where lack of foreign peering suggests a **fragile infrastructure without visible opportunities for improvement**



No existing peers




No potential peers




No potential peers

# First Sign of Concern on Route Diversity: Foreign Peering is Rare (Step 1)




Percentage of each country's address space where we have found no evidence of international peering.

# First Sign of Concern on Route Diversity: Foreign Peering is Rare (Step 2)





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n = 25



n = 75


False

True

*Is this country served primarily by transit ASes?*

# First Sign of Concern on Route Diversity: Foreign Peering is Rare (Step 2)

We confirmed these assertions with operators in seven countries:



1. Cameroon
2. D.R. Congo
3. Sudan
4. Zimbabwe
5. Lesotho
6. Ethiopia
7. Venezuela

n = 25




False

True


n = 75

*Is this country served primarily by transit ASes?*

# Country-Level Transit Influence Defined (1/3)



# Country-Level Transit Influence Defined



Transit influence of  $AS_t$  on country C:

Fraction of addresses originated by any  $AS_o$  in country C where  $AS_t$  is present as a transit provider **filtered to account for incomplete observations**

$$CTI \sim [0,1]$$


# Using CTI to Quantify Inbound Route Diversity

## Lower route diversity

Most vulnerable to adverse events affecting a single AS

## Higher route diversity

Least vulnerable to adverse events affecting a single AS




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CTI declines quickly: in many countries route are concentrated


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
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


In 49 of 51 non-landlocked countries, a submarine cable operator is ranked in top 5 by CTI



# Using CTI to Quantify Inbound Route Diversity

We discussed the set of top ASes by CTI with operators in 5 countries:



# Telefónica (AS12956) Dominates Transit in Spanish-Speaking Latin America

Solicitamos apoyo validando esta lista de países en LACNIC

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Country	Rank by CTI	CTI
Bolivia	1	0.55
Peru	1	0.44
Chile	2	0.24
Colombia	2	0.19
Ecuador	4	0.12
Nicaragua	4	0.08
Guatemala	6	0.04
Belice	8	0.03
Honduras	8	0.04
El Salvador	8	0.02

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# C&W (AS23520) Dominates Transit in the Caribbean

Solicitamos apoyo validando esta lista de países en LACNIC

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Country	Rank by CTI	CTI
Trinidad y Tobago	1	0.58
Belice	1	0.47
Haiti	1	0.40
Guyana	2	0.34
Venezuela	1	0.33
Honduras	3	0.14
Cuba	3	0.11
Ecuador	6	0.06
Nicaragua	8	0.04
Guatemala	8	0.03
El Salvador	10	0.01

# Summary

- We built a tool to identify countries served primarily by transit links
- CTI captures concentration of inbound routes towards each of those countries
- Route diversity varies greatly across countries, some are very centralized

# Thank you! Questions?

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[cseweb.ucsd.edu/~agamero](http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~agamero)

Region	Countries of Concern (Lower Route Diversity)
Central America and the Caribbean	Venezuela, Panama, Haiti, El Salvador, Cuba, Guyana, Bahamas, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Honduras, Belize, St. Lucia, Barbados, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, St. Kitts & Nevis
South and Central Asia	India, Mongolia, Thailand, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Turkmenistan, Georgia, Uzbekistan, East Timor, Armenia
West and Central Africa	Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Cape Verde, Congo D.R.C., Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali
Middle East and North Africa	Libya, Yemen, Qatar, Oman, Turkey, Egypt, Kuwait, Palestine, Jordan, Afghanistan, Iraq
East Africa	Ethiopia, Zambia, Somalia, Sudan
South Pacific	Tonga, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Samoa, Nauru
Andes Mountains (excl. Caribbean)	Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Chile
Balkans	Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia
Southern Africa	Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Eswatini (Swaziland)
Western and Central Mediterranean	Portugal, Morocco, Malta
Landlocked Countries (excl. above regions)	Luxembourg, San Marino, Belarus
South Korea	South Korea