





# Knowledge of Internet Structure: Measurement, Epistemology, and Technology

David Clark

kc claffy




*C-Accel Team A-7165*




# Why are we home during this pandemic?

The Internet is  
*holding society together*  
(and *saving lives*)

Because we  
*can* be.







# What holds the Internet together?

Plumbing we rarely hear about,  
highly vulnerable to  
misconfiguration and abuse.

What's under  
the hood?






# three key Internet systems

Domain Naming  
System

[www.caida.org](http://www.caida.org)  
↓  
192.172.226.123


**maps names to  
addresses**  
( [www.caida.org](http://www.caida.org) )

Addressing  
Architecture




**provides addresses for  
connected devices**  
( [12.3.4.5](#) )

Interdomain  
Routing System



**determines paths to  
those addresses**  
( [12.3.4.0/24](#) )





# trusting plumbing

## Naming

maps **domain names**  
( [www.mit.edu](http://www.mit.edu) )  
to **addresses**

[www.mit.edu](http://www.mit.edu)





this can  
go wrong

12.3.4.5

- 740K domain names associated with abuse
- *proprietary data/inferences*

— ICANN monthly DAAR report April 2020





# trusting plumbing


Naming


provides **addresses** for  
connected devices  
( 12.3.4.5 )



Addressing

- spoofing to launch attacks, evade policies, impersonate






# trusting plumbing

Naming


determines **paths** to those addresses  
( 12.3.4.5)




Addressing

- abuse of routing to steal cryptocurrency
- ...or generate \$29M fraudulent ad revenue

Routing





# why problems persist for decades

historically


- academic roots of Internet architecture
- did not assume adversaries in devices
- once threat model was clear...

approaches  
have been

- technical, neglecting political economy
- global in scope, or no benefit
- complex, expensive, *architectural* changes...

incompatible  
with reality

- lowest cost operational practices
- some governments less focused on security
- all governments lack *knowledge*



# team leadership



kc claffy




- Director, Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis
- Research Scientist and Adjunct CSE faculty, UCSD
- 30 years of experience with Internet data analysis




David Clark



- Development of Internet protocols since 1970s
- Chaired Internet Architecture Board 1981-1989
- Tech.Dir. of MIT Internet Policy Research Institute
- Recent book "Designing an Internet" (NSF program)




# the problem




data-rich (sort of)


knowledge-poor




# the solution



1) Increase open knowledge




2) Inform operational practices



3) Enforce operational practices





# operational practices: routing

“code of conduct”

- 1) *Prevent illegitimate routes*
- 2) *Correct contact info in DBs*
- 3) *Publish routing policies*
- 4) *Prevent forged traffic*

But are ISPs complying?




**MANRS**

Mutually  
Agreed  
Norms for  
Routing  
Security

[Internet Society]






# When compliance measured..

*Participating networks are not complying any more than others.*

Network Hygiene, Incentives, and Regulation: Deployment of Source Address Validation in the Internet", ACM Computer and Comm. Security (CCS), Nov 2019.




**MANRS**  
Mutually  
Agreed  
Norms for  
Routing  
Security



# Driving Insight

OKN needed

Phase I confirmed that  
open knowledge network is  
required to demonstrate  
compliance with routing security  
best practice.




# 2-year roadmap

## Year 1: Technical knowledge

- Identify properties consistent w/misbehavior
- Tools to understand & remediate configuration problems
- Catalog best practices (BGP, DNS)
- Begin to translate into actionable knowledge

## Year 2: Actionable knowledge

- Cross-disciplinary cross-sector cross-jurisdictional
- Align incentives
- Extend, socialize, accelerate deployment of practices
- Sustainability



# A-7165 OKN: KISMET

## academic



David Clark




kc claffy



UC San Diego  
JACOBS SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING  
Computer Science and Engineering



## government



NIST  
National Institute of  
Standards and Technology



## industry

Interisle  
Consulting Group



VERISIGN

FARSIGHT  
SECURITY



COMCAST



## non-profit



DNS-OARC





Internet  
Society

M<sup>3</sup>AAWG









# project summary

We propose a knowledge network to improve the security and functioning of three key but inherently vulnerable systems that underpin all activity on the Internet, including all OKNs!

*Change security landscape  
from reactive to proactive.*

Treat the Internet like the  
critical infrastructure it is.





# A-7165 Booth Agenda

Presentation at 0:15 and 0:45 after the hour!

Please type questions into Q&A popup window.

***<https://www.caida.org/projects/kismet/>***