## fling: A Flexible Ping for Middlebox Measurements

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AIMs 2018

March 14<sup>th</sup> 2018

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#### Motivation

 Lack of a generic tool that can assess whether an arbitrary communication pattern between end points would succeed

> Will my new protocol/protocolextension be blocked or modified by middleboxes?



### fling (flexible-Ping) is an end-to-end active measurement tool

- Allows testing whether an arbitrary sequence of packets can be exchanged between a fling client and a fling server
- Uses raw sockets and supports both IPv4 and IPv6
- Tests needs to be only specified at the server side
- Can narrow down the location of packet modification or drop


#### Middleboxes measurement tools

Tool	Raw sock- ets	Test protocols other than TCP	Test update: need to change	Fully con- trolled client- server dialogue	Detecting location of modification and drop
fling	$\checkmark$	✓	Server	$\checkmark$	✓
Netalyzr	×	✓*	Server	$\checkmark$	✓ <sup>‡</sup>
TCPExposure	$\checkmark$	×	Both	$\checkmark$	×
HICCUPS	✓	×	Both	$\checkmark$	×
Tracebox	1	1	Client	×	✓‡
PATHspider	$\checkmark$	1	Client	×	✓‡
TBit	$\checkmark$	×	Client	×	×

Table: Comparison of related tools. \*ICMP,UDP; <sup>‡</sup>One-sided only




#### How does it work?



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#### How does it work?



(a) json file for a simple TCP SYN-SYN/ACK dialogue test (b) Protocol instance


#### Challenges

- Mapping packets into corresponding test sequence
- Detect whether packets are really dropped
- Infer the location of packet modification or drop




# How to identify packets that belong to a particular test?

- fling uses nonce and protocol numbers for packet identification
- The packet's nonce is (salt,random\_number)
  - Salt is 8-bit number generated by the server for each test
  - The server also generates a random number for each packet
  - The nonce position in the packet is defined in the Json file




#### **Detect the drop of test packets**

 To confirm drops of tests packets fling sends, along with every test packet, an anchor packet (TCP SYN-SYN/ACK, UDP, or ICMP)





#### **Detect the drop of test packets**




<i>fling</i> packet	<i>anchor</i> packet	Interpretation
PASSED	PASSED	SUCCESS
PASSED	DROPPED	SUCCESS
DROPPED	PASSED	Repeat 3×. Then, assume: MIDDLEBOX DROP; start tracebox-like test
DROPPED	DROPPED	Repeat $3 \times$ . Then, assume:CONGESTION;starttracebox-like test

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# Detecting the location of modification or drop

- In case a test packet is dropped fling re-sends the test packet with an increasing TTL
- RFC 1812- compliant routers enclose the entire packet in the payload of the ICMP error message



# Case study: uses fling to check whether DSCP code points survive end-to-end paths

- WebRTC would like use DSCP code-points to signal QoS expectations but does it really work?
- We tested three DSCP values: CS1 (low priority data), AF42 (Multimedia conferencing) and EF (Telephony)





#### Clients

Testbed	IPv4	IPv6
Ark	111	46
NorNet Core	40	19
PlanetLab	14	-

34 IPv4 servers 18 IPv6 servers

~10K IPv4 paths ~2K IPv6 paths

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
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298 IPv4 Ases and 119 IPv6 ASes

All key large transit providers + many access providers e.g. ComCast, Bharti AirTel and CenturyLink.

### Case study: uses fling to check whether DSCP code points survive end-to-end paths

DSCP markings survived e2e in 33% and 50% for IPv4 and IPv6, respectively



Fraction of measured paths where DSCP markings survive end to end


# Do packets with DSCP markings risk being blackholed?

Code Point	Direction	Total failures	# clients	#servers
CS1	Forward	18	6	10
CS1	Reverse	74	27	31
AF42	Forward	28	9	16
AF42	Reverse	74	27	28
EF	Forward	28	9	17
EF	Reverse	76	23	32
All	Forward	13	3	6
All	Reverse	27	11	15

None of these failures happened at TTL 1 or 2

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
#### Where was DSCP re-marked?



Changed in	IPv4	IPv6
Home network	21%	12%
First-hop AS	43%	31%
Beyond the first-hop AS	36%	57%

- Home gateways treats DSCP in a myriad of ways: zero, re-write to unused value, re-write to a used value
- First hop Ases often zero DSCP

### ASes beyond the first-hop AS employ a diverse set of re-marking policies



Autonomous System Numbers

Autonomous System Numbers

EF

- Cogent remarks everything to either AF11 or AF21
- Other large ISPs do not seem to modify DSCP markings

### Limitations of the DSCP study

- Although we have around 10k paths, the coverage remains sparse
- The fact that DSCP marking survives does not imply that marked traffic will be treated differently
- All probes are in fixed networks



#### **Takeaways**

- fling is a flexible tool that allows for a wide range of middlebox tests
- We have used fling to investigate whether DSCP markings survive routers and middleboxes
- Please help us increasing our coverage by running fling (email me <u>ahmed@simula.no</u>)