

# QUIC Measurements on Ark

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
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AIMS-19



- QUIC [1] is a transport protocol with growing adoption
  - Major web services (Google, Meta, etc.) are using QUIC
  - HTTP/3 [2] is built on QUIC
  - Compelling target for in-depth measurements
- Encrypted-by-default challenges
  - **Limited passive measurement opportunities**
  - Active measurements are essential to study QUIC behavior and its global deployment
- QScanner [3] is a feature-rich tool for large-scale QUIC scans
  - However, measurements are **limited to a single vantage point (VP)**
  - Restricts visibility in scenarios like geo-distributed CDN deployments or geo-blocking
  - Need globally distributed infrastructure → **Archipelago (Ark)** [4]

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[1] Jana Iyengar and Martin Thomson. QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport. RFC 9000. 2021

[2] Mike Bishop. HTTP/3. RFC 9114. 2022

[3] TUM Chair of Network Architectures and Services. QScanner. <https://github.com/tumi8/QScanner>. 2022

[4] Archipelago (Ark) Measurement Infrastructure. <https://www.caida.org/projects/ark/>. Accessed: 2026-02-03

- Goal: Deploy **QUIC scanning in the field-tested Ark infrastructure**
  - Transferring our proven approach and insights from QScanner
  - Unlock new opportunities to study QUIC's behavior
  - In **diverse geographic and network conditions**



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## Choosing a QUIC Stack: Design Trade-offs

- QUIC runs **entirely in user space**
  - No kernel implementation is currently available, but work is in progress<sup>1</sup>
  - A QUIC library must be chosen and integrated
  
- Avoid integrating a **full QUIC stack**
  - QUIC is complex: Flow & congestion control, loss recovery, ...
  - Rapidly evolving ecosystem
  
- Design choice: **Minimal integration overhead**
  - **OpenSSL  $\geq$  3.2** provides native QUIC client support (since Nov. 2023)
  - Interoperable with all major QUIC implementations<sup>2</sup>
  - Commonly available on most systems
  - Scamper already depends on OpenSSL
  - **No new external dependencies**

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<sup>1</sup><https://lwn.net/Articles/1029851>

<sup>2</sup>[https://github.com/openssl/openssl/actions/workflows/run\\_quic\\_interop.yml](https://github.com/openssl/openssl/actions/workflows/run_quic_interop.yml)

## QUIC Integration in Scamper

- New Scamper command `quic`
    - Inspired by Scamper's `http` command
    - Similar structure and handling of connections and library calls
  - Implemented **Python bindings**
    - Like Scamper does for other measurement primitives
    - Enables easy integration into existing Python-based analysis pipelines
  - Perform a QUIC handshake with targets and **capture all QUIC packets**
    - Together with TLS keys for decryption
    - Results saved in **warts<sup>3</sup>** files
    - Can be converted to PCAPs using `sc_warts2pcap`
    - Analysis separated from measurement process
- **Future compatibility**

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<sup>3</sup><https://www.caida.org/catalog/software/scamper/man/warts.5.pdf>

```
./scamper -c "quic -d 443 -h 'example.com' -a h3 -0 insecure" -i 23.215.0.136
```

Usage string: quic

[-d dport]

- Destination port

[-h host]

- Set as Server Name Indication (SNI) and used for certificate verification

[-a alpn-protos]

- Comma-separated list of Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) names
- ALPN must be specified for QUIC handshakes according to RFC 9001 [5]

[-c ciphersuites], [-g groups], [-s sigalgs]

- Lists of TLS 1.3 cipher suites, groups, and signature algorithms to offer during the handshake
- Allows testing server behavior with different configurations, e.g., PQC algorithms

[-0 option]

- Currently only `insecure` is implemented: disables certificate verification
- More options can be added in the future, e.g., QUIC transport parameters

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[5] Martin Thomson and Sean Turner. Using TLS to Secure QUIC. RFC 9001. 2021

## PCAP of a Scamper QUIC measurement against Cloudflare quiche on port 4433

- CONNECTION\_CLOSE frame with reason phrase sent

| No. | Time     | Source Port | Destination Port | Protocol | Length | Info  |
|-----|----------|-------------|------------------|----------|--------|---|
| 1   | 0.000000 | 52026       | 4433             | QUIC     | 2432   | Initial, DCID=5441cbb8286a8cc5, PKN: 1, CRYPTO, PADDING                                   |
| 2   | 0.011456 | 4433        | 52026            | QUIC     | 1232   | Handshake, SCID=a5d0cbb9a4b890809b0d5aead649c5e90d1bdec7, PKN: 1, CRYPTO                  |
| 3   | 0.011863 | 4433        | 52026            | QUIC     | 429    | Handshake, SCID=a5d0cbb9a4b890809b0d5aead649c5e90d1bdec7, PKN: 2, CRYPTO                  |
| 4   | 0.049370 | 52026       | 4433             | QUIC     | 1390   | Protected Payload (KP0), DCID=a5d0cbb9a4b890809b0d5aead649c5e90d1bdec7, PKN: 0, STREAM(0) |
| 5   | 0.053100 | 4433        | 52026            | HTTP3    | 553    | Protected Payload (KP0), PKN: 3, ACK, NCI, DONE, CRYPTO, STREAM(3), SETTINGS              |
| 6   | 0.053898 | 4433        | 52026            | HTTP3    | 56     | Protected Payload (KP0), PKN: 4, STREAM(7)  |
| 7   | 0.054272 | 4433        | 52026            | HTTP3    | 56     | Protected Payload (KP0), PKN: 5, STREAM(11)   |
| 8   | 0.057885 | 4433        | 52026            | HTTP3    | 81     | Protected Payload (KP0), PKN: 6, STREAM(15)   |
| 9   | 0.099480 | 52026       | 4433             | QUIC     | 287    | Protected Payload (KP0), DCID=775b93a6b74ccd5bc5a9ad6d0f71d72fc8e661fa, PKN: 5, ACK, CC   |

```

> Frame 9: 287 bytes on wire (2296 bits), 287 bytes captured (22
> Null/Loopback
> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 127.0.0.1, Dst: 127.0.0.1
> User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 52026, Dst Port: 4433
> QUIC IETF
> QUIC IETF
> QUIC IETF
> QUIC IETF
> QUIC IETF
< QUIC IETF
  [Packet Length: 69]
  > QUIC Short Header DCID=775b93a6b74ccd5bc5a9ad6d0f71d72fc8e6f
  > ACK
  < CONNECTION_CLOSE (Application) Error code: 0x2328
    Frame Type: CONNECTION_CLOSE (Application) (0x0000000000)
    Application Error code: 9000
    Reason phrase Length: 18
    Reason phrase: Scamper probe done
    
```

- Many systems have an **old OpenSSL version** installed
  - QUIC support was only added in OpenSSL 3.2 (Nov. 2023)
  - Must ensure that the target system has OpenSSL  $\geq$  3.2 installed
  - Debian Trixie ships with OpenSSL 3.5
  - **Test across multiple target distributions early** to uncover dependency mismatches
- QUIC transport parameters are currently **not configurable** in OpenSSL's QUIC stack
  - Restricts our ability to evaluate server behavior under varying transport parameter settings
  - A pull request has been submitted to OpenSSL<sup>4</sup>
  - Changes are expected to be merged in the immediate future
  - **Contribute to open-source projects** to close feature gaps and accelerate development

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<sup>4</sup><https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/29664>

- **Post-Quantum Cryptography**

- Detection of PQ/hybrid key exchange (KE) groups in TLS 1.3
- Measurable deployment share: ~41 % support rate
- Consistent across VPs

| Library                  | ASes                          | PQ KE Support  |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------|
| <b>Akamai</b>            | AKAMAI-AS, AKAMAI-ASN1        | ×              |
| <b>LSQUIC</b>            | mixed                         | ×              |
| <b>MsQuic</b>            | mixed                         | ×              |
| <b>nginx</b>             | mixed                         | ○              |
| <b>quic-go</b>           | mixed                         | ○              |
| <b>Cloudflare quiche</b> | CLOUDFLARE                    | ✓              |
| <b>Google QUICHE</b>     | GOOGLE, GOOGLE-CLOUD-PLATFORM | ✓ <sup>5</sup> |
| <b>mvfst</b>             | FACEBOOK                      | ✓ <sup>6</sup> |
| <b>quicly</b>            | FASTLY                        | ✓              |
| <b>s2n-quic</b>          | AMAZON-02                     | ✓              |

<sup>5</sup>PQC support mainly in *GOOGLE* AS and not widely deployed in *GOOGLE-CLOUD-PLATFORM* AS

<sup>6</sup>We found 1 off-net deployment without PQC support

- We want to make QUIC measurements **easily accessible** to the research community!
  - QUIC-enabled Scamper currently deployed on test VPs: DE, NZ, US, UK, FR, PL, JP
  - Status: Merge into main Scamper codebase — *work in progress*
  - Available to the public soon!
  
- Currently working on my Master's thesis: **Analyzing QUIC deployments on the Internet**
  - **TLS features:** Cipher suites, certificates, PQC support
  - **QUIC features:** Deployed QUIC libraries, transport parameters
  - **Network features:** Handshake latency, anycast deployments

Which QUIC measurements would be most useful to you?

Which scanning features would add the most value for the community?

- [1] Jana Iyengar and Martin Thomson. QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport. RFC 9000. 2021.
- [2] Mike Bishop. HTTP/3. RFC 9114. 2022.
- [3] TUM Chair of Network Architectures and Services. QScanner. <https://github.com/tumi8/QScanner>. 2022.
- [4] Archipelago (Ark) Measurement Infrastructure. <https://www.caida.org/projects/ark/>. Accessed: 2026-02-03.
- [5] Martin Thomson and Sean Turner. Using TLS to Secure QUIC. RFC 9001. 2021.