Effects of RPKI Deployment on BGP Security

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BGP Routing
Securing BGP
BGP Modeling & Simulation
Simulation Results



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
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AS Level Internet



From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Internet_Connectivity_Distribution_%26_Core.svg

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BGP Routing 4

Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)

Responsible for Internet connectivity

Concepts

- Autonomous System (AS)
- Prefix routing
- Routing decisions based on
 - Path length
 - Network policies
 - Business relations (customer, provider, peer, sibling)
- Scaling at massive rate
 - AS count: ~37k
 - Prefix count: ~360k (IPv4) & ~7k (IPv6)



Problems with BGP

BGP pathological behaviors

- Large number of types of attack have been described
- Very few mitigation actions taken
- Increased impact of attacks on today's Internet as an essential and ubiquitous service
 - Pakistan Telecom hijacking of YouTube in Feb 2008
 - 15% of global Internet traffic redirected through China Telecom for 18min in April 2010 (acknowledged months later)



Securing BGP

Main cause of malfunction: misconfiguration

- Several security additions proposed: S-BGP, psBGP, soBGP, IRV, etc
- Most important based on RPKI deployment
- BGP cannot be secured overnight!
- ASes as commercial entities must also realize it's in their own interest



Project Goals

- Study the effect of BGP deployment scenarios
- Find out order to start securing ASes for maximum benefit
- Better protocol understanding: relation between no. of secured ASs and validated routes
 - Impact of securing just biggest ASs (e.g. Tier 1)
 - How important is securing CDNs?



BGP Security Mechanisms

Secure Origin Authentication (SOA)

- Routes in BGP updates contain signature of origin AS
- Each AS validates signature by looking in a distributed cache
- Will there be downtimes?

Path Validation (PV)

When forwarding route advertisements to neighbors, ASes sign route with chain hash function





BGP Modeling & Simulation (1)

You can't simulate the Internet!

Abstract protocol and network:

- no physical network modeling, 1 AS = 1 node (ignore IBGP)
- standard BGP features: explicit prefix tables, announce and withdraw messages, route propagation according to policies, etc.

Security model:

- tag BGP messages as being validated or not
- security policies assigned to ASes individually



BGP Modeling & Simulation (2)

- Allow for easy implementation of security solutions
 - We can emulate practically any proposed security additions
- Do not perform crypto computations, but emulate
- Abstract what you can, but run everything in (scaled) real-time
- Gather as much real-world data/scenarios and run the simulation upon them





Our Simulator

- Enhanced version of simulator by M. Wojciechowski (2009)
- Java simulator running on DAS-4 homogeneous cluster; low latency network
- Each AS is a separate thread (>1000 threads per node)
- Allows easy tweaking of BGP behavior and security policies
- Uses network annotated adjacencies from CAIDA for 2010












BGP Simulation 13





Simulation Process

Running scenarios:

- 1. Assign security policies in various percentages
- 2. Announce the same prefix from two ASes (one secured AS and one rogue AS)
- 3. Wait for prefix to propagate
- 4. Count routes to **secured** AS

Factors:

- What if topology changes?
- What is the impact of different types of security policies?
- What is the impact of different security policy distributions?
- How does it differ when prefix announced by stubs vs. large ASs?



Security Policies

Ignore

Standard BGP

Prefer

- Choose validated route between routes of same length
- Most realistic

Secure

Always prefer validated routes over unknown

Strict

Accept only validated routes


Uncertain

Same as Secure, but introducing introducing route validation unavailability in 10% of cases

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
SOA: Global Deployment – Random Strategy



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
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SOA: Global Deployment – Top-down Strategy



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SOA: Global Deployment – Medium Strategy




SOA Simulation Results 19

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
Inducing un-connectivity



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




SOA Simulation Results 21



SOA: RIPE Deployment – Random Strategy



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
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Securing CDNs

The New Internet – "Hyper Giants" CDNs Craig Labovitz (Arbor Networks)




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SOA Simulation Results 23

SOA: Global Deployment – Random Strategy




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PV: Global Deployment – Top-down Strategy



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Conclusions

- A bit better understanding of BGP
- More detailed simulations of security deployment
- Guide for favorable turnover for investments in BGP security
- Results show trends instead of specific AS behavior due to many levels of abstractions
- Future study: Include time dynamic experiments in study (convergence time of validated vs. rogue prefix announcements)

