# Abuse of the IPv4 Transfer Markets

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
AIMS 2020






## **IPv4** Transfers

IPv4 address transactions that occur between organisations



### Transfer markets: viable source of IPv4 space

Transfer market size is increasing (number of transactions and IP addresses)




# Overview

Do IPv4 transfer markets pose an opportunity for malicious actors?

- 1. Compile and process the IPv4 transferred addresses
  - Usage of the IP address space
  - Participants on the IPv4 transfer market
- 2. Analyze the IP addresses against a dataset of malicious activities
  - Blacklisted IP addresses
  - Blacklisting timing

#### Datasets



[1] RIRs, IPv4 reported transfers

[2] Routeviews and RIPE RIS

[3] USC/ISC LANDER project, https://www.isi.edu/~johnh/PAPERS/Heidemann09b.html

[4] RAPID7's project Sonar, TCP and UDP scans, <u>https://opendata.rapid7.com/</u>

[5] Zhao et al., A Decade of Mal-Activity Reporting: A Retrospective Analysis of Internet Malicious Activity Blacklists, AsiaCCS 2019


[6] UCEPROTECT: Network Project, http://www.uceprotect.net/en/

[7] Badpackets (<u>https://badpackets.net/botnet-c2-detections/</u>), BinaryEdge (<u>https://www.binaryedge.io/data.html</u>)

[8] Testart et al., Profiling BGP Serial Hijackers: Capturing Persistent Misbehavior in the Global Routing Table, IMC 2019


# Significant percentage of the transferred prefixes appears blacklisted

Blacklisted transferred IPs are distributed across 40% of the routed prefixes.




# Significant percentage of the transferred prefixes appears blacklisted

Transferred prefixes are disproportionally represented in the blacklist for every type of malicious activity except spamming



## When do the transferred IPs get blacklisted?

- Compare the transfer date with the blacklisting timing
- Buyers are more prone to abuse of the IP space



#### **Future Work**

• Develop predictive techniques for blacklisting based on monitoring the reported IPv4 transfers

• Augment our malicious datasets (IBR, DDoS, Spoofing, Honeypots)

• Investigate non-canonical patterns in the reported transfer (e.g networks are both seller and buyer)