

Subsidization Competition: Vitalizing the Neutral Internet


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
WIE 2014

Internet's two-sided market



- ❑ Problem is not in the transit market
 - Fiber optics backbone, rare congestion
 - Competitive market with declining prices
 - CPs bypass Tier-1 ISPs to improve performance
- ❑ But in the mobile access market
 - High mobile infrastructure costs
 - One-side pricing from end-users
 - Lower profit margin than those of the CPs
 - Few incentives for investments

About this work




- Propose and study “subsidization competition”
 - CPs could voluntarily subsidize its users' usage costs
- Differences to sponsored data plan/“zero rate”
 1. Partial subsidization is allowed
 2. ISPs charge the same per-unit rate, regardless the source of revenue (no secret deals with CPs)

Basic system model (m, μ)

- Focus on an access ISP with capacity μ and a set \mathcal{N} of CPs. For each $i \in \mathcal{N}$, denote
 - m_i : user size, λ_i : avg per user throughput
 - $\theta_i \triangleq m_i \lambda_i$ as throughput and $\theta \triangleq \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} \theta_i$
- Define $\phi \triangleq \Phi(\theta, \mu)$ as the system utilization
 - $\Phi(\theta, \mu) \nearrow \theta$; $\Phi(\theta, \mu) \searrow \mu$
 - can be seen as system congestion
- User throughput satisfies $\lambda_i \triangleq \lambda_i(\phi) \searrow \phi$

Basic system model (\mathbf{m}, μ)




- ϕ is the utilization of a system (\mathbf{m}, μ) iff

$$\phi = \Phi \left(\sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} m_i \lambda_i(\phi), \mu \right)$$

- utilization is unique \rightarrow throughput of CPs

One-sided pricing model

- If ISP charges p , its revenue is $R \triangleq p\theta$
- User size: $m_i \triangleq m_i(p) \searrow p$



One-sided pricing model

□ Price effect:

$$\frac{\partial \phi}{\partial p} \leq 0; \quad \frac{\partial \theta}{\partial p} \leq 0.$$

□ CP i 's throughput θ_i increases with price p iff

$$\epsilon_p^{m_i} / \epsilon_\phi^{\lambda_i} < -\epsilon_p^\phi$$


where $\epsilon_x^y \triangleq \frac{\partial y}{\partial x} \frac{x}{y}$ denotes the x -elasticity of y .

- $|\epsilon_p^{m_i}|$ small: users are not price sensitive
- $|\epsilon_\phi^{\lambda_i}|$ large: traffic is very sensitive to congestion

Subsidization model

- Denote q as a policy that limits the subsidy, each CP i choose to subsidize $s_i \in [0, q]$
- Denote s as the strategy profile of the CPs
- User size becomes $m_i = m_i(t_i) = m_i(p - s_i)$
- CP's utility becomes $U_i = (v_i - s_i)\theta_i$
- Define social welfare $W = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} v_i \theta_i$

Subsidization model



ISP decision



CP decision




Regulatory decision



ISP objective



CP objective



Regulatory objective



System state



Forward link



Feedback link

Nash equilibrium

- For price p and policy q , a strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium iff each s_i solves

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Max } U_i(s_i; \mathbf{s}_{-i}) &= (v_i - s_i)\theta_i(\mathbf{s}) \\ \text{s.t. } 0 &\leq s_i \leq q. \end{aligned}$$

- There exists a unique Nash equilibrium if for any $s' \neq s$, there always exist CP i such that

$$(s'_i - s_i)(u_i(s') - u_i(s)) < 0$$

where $u_i = \partial U_i(s) / \partial s_i$ defines the marginal utility.

Dynamics of equilibrium

- If a CP i 's profitability increases unilaterally from v_i to v'_i , under Nash equilibrium, $s'_i \geq s_i$.
- Dynamics of the Nash equilibrium:

$$\frac{\partial s_i}{\partial q} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } s_i = 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } s_i = q \\ \dots & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\frac{\partial s_i}{\partial p} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } s_i = 0 \text{ or } s_i = q \\ \dots & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Policy implications

- Result: Under fixed price p , if marginal utility matrix is off-diagonally monotone,

$$\frac{\partial \phi}{\partial q} \geq 0, \quad \frac{\partial R}{\partial q} \geq 0 \text{ and } \frac{\partial s_i}{\partial q} \geq 0 \forall i \in \mathcal{N}$$

- Deregulation incentivize CPs to subsidize, increase system utilization and ISP revenue
- ❖ Implications: deregulation is desirable for improving investment incentives for ISPs

Policy under ISP's optimal price

□ Consider a 3-stage game:

1. Regulator chooses policy q
2. ISP chooses optimal price $p(q)$
3. CPs choose subsidies s



□ Policy effect: $\frac{dm_i}{dq} = \dots, \frac{d\phi}{dq} = \dots, \frac{d\lambda_i}{dq} = \dots$

□ CP i 's θ_i decreases with relaxed policy q iff

$$\epsilon_{t_i}^{m_i} \epsilon_q^{t_i} / \epsilon_\phi^{\lambda_i} = \epsilon_q^{m_i} / \epsilon_\phi^{\lambda_i} > -\epsilon_q^\phi$$

- $|\epsilon_{t_i}^{m_i}|$ small: users are not price sensitive
- $|\epsilon_\phi^{\lambda_i}|$ large: traffic is sensitive to congestion
- $|\epsilon_q^{t_i}|$ small: CP is less profitable

Revenue and social welfare



- ❖ Relaxed policy induces higher R and W
- ❖ Price regulation might be needed

Conclusions

- ❑ Study subsidization competition among CPs,
 - ISP uses the same per-unit charge
 - Partial subsidy is allowed
- ❑ Properties
 - the network is physically neutral
 - it creates a feedback loop for CPs to compete
 - increase access revenue and attract investment
- ❑ Caveats
 - Utilization will increase, some CPs have lower rates
 - ISP's price might need to be regulated if the market is not competitive enough

FCC Open Internet Order

- Transparency 
 - must disclose network management practices, performance characteristics, and ...
- No blocking 
 - may not block lawful content, applications, services, non-harmful devices ...
- No unreasonable discrimination 
 - may not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic ...

How do we want to regulate?

- ❑ It is about “no unreasonable discrimination”
- ❑ Existing solution
 - impose an absolute minimum requirement for ordinary class
 - however, ISPs have different capacities ...
- ❑ Our proposal
 - restrict the maximum gap in service quality
 - implication: if you make premium class better, you need to make ordinary class better too.

References

- Richard T. B. Ma. "Subsidization Competition: Vitalizing the Neutral Internet." *ACM CoNEXT Conference 2014*
- Jing Tang and Richard T. B. Ma. "Regulating Monopolistic ISPs Without Neutrality." *IEEE ICNP Conference, 2014.*